People v. Oliver
2016 COA 180
| Colo. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- In June 2012 Rollin Michael Oliver shot toward a group at a public event; a stray bullet killed a Denver police officer. Oliver pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 26 years; the court ordered restitution.
- The prosecution requested $365,565.07 restitution payable to the City & County of Denver Risk Management Department (the Department) for medical costs, survivor benefits already paid, and future survivor benefits the Department would owe under Colorado’s Workers’ Compensation Act.
- Oliver filed a Crim. P. 35(a) motion arguing the restitution order was illegal because (1) the Department was not a “victim” under the restitution statutes and (2) the award improperly included future earnings-type losses (death benefits calculated from the officer’s average weekly wage), which are excluded from restitution.
- At a hearing the Department’s subrogation/claims manager testified the City self-insures and the Department functions as the City’s workers’ compensation insurer, paying medical and statutory death benefits to dependents under the Act.
- The district court reaffirmed the $365,565.07 restitution award, concluding the Department qualified as an insurer-victim under the restitution statute. Oliver appealed.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Oliver’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Department is a “victim” entitled to restitution | Department is an insurer who suffered pecuniary loss and thus is a victim under § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(III) | Department is not a victim: (a) court relied on post-offense statutory amendments; (b) under the pre-2013 statute the Department was not a direct victim; (c) no written contract existed between officer and Department | Court: Department is a victim. It functioned as the City’s workers’ compensation insurer and had a contractual relationship (as insurer/third-party beneficiary) with the officer, so restitution to it was authorized. |
| Whether the district court improperly relied on 2013 statutory language | People: alternative statutory ground (2011 text) supports restitution | Oliver: court erred by citing 2013 amendments in a 2012 offense | Court: reliance on 2013 amendments was error but harmless because the 2011 subsection (III) independently supports the award. |
| Whether a contractual relationship requires a written contract | People: contractual relationship exists via insurance arrangement and third‑party beneficiary status | Oliver: no written contract between Department and officer so no contractual relationship | Court: subsection (III) does not require a written contract; the employer–insurer–employee relationship suffices as a contractual relationship. |
| Whether workers’ compensation death benefits constitute excluded “loss of future earnings” | People: death benefits are statutory insurance payouts (out‑of‑pocket & anticipated expenses) distinct from lost future earnings | Oliver: death benefits are calculated from average weekly wage and therefore are “loss of future earnings,” which restitution excludes | Court: death benefits are independent insurance/dependent benefits, not loss of the victim’s future earnings, and may be included as restitution. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41 (Colo. 2009) (statutory interpretation of "victim" in restitution context)
- People v. Rogers, 20 P.3d 1238 (Colo. App. 2000) (workers’ compensation insurer may recover medical benefits as restitution)
- People v. Woodward, 11 P.3d 1090 (Colo. 2000) (insurers can be restitution victims)
- City of Loveland Police Dep’t v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 141 P.3d 943 (Colo. App. 2006) (distinguishing death/disability benefits; rule of independence)
- People v. Bryant, 122 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2005) (definition and temporal scope of "loss of future earnings" for restitution)
- U.S. Nat’l Bank of Denver v. Indus. Comm’n, 262 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1953) (workers’ compensation death benefits are fixed statutory employer obligations rather than true substitution for parental support)