Opinion by
Defendant, Michael John Rogers, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to set aside or mоdify his restitution order. We affirm.
In May 1995, defendant struck a flag person in a construction zone with his vehicle, causing her sеrious bodily injury. As the victim was on the job at the time of the accident, her workers' compensation carrier, Cоlorado Compensation Insurance Authority (CCIA), paid her medical expenses. See §§ 10-4-707(1)(c) & 10-4-707(5), C.R.8.2000.
Defendant subsequently pled guilty to a charge of vehicular assault, a class four felony. See § 18-3-205(1)(b)(I), C.R.S.2000. The trial court sentenced dеfendant to four years of probation; in addition, it ordered that defendant pay $46,158.28 in restitution. The majority of this amоunt was to be paid to CCIA,.
In 1998, defendant filed a motion to set aside the restitution order. In his motion, he claimed that, аs CCIA would have no right of subrogation under § 10-4-718(1), C.R.98.2000, for the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits paid to the injured worker, it could not receive restitution for those amounts. The trial court denied the motion.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion. We disagree.
In support of his contention, defendant pоints to provisions of the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act, $ 10-4-701, et seq.. C.R.3.2000 (the No Fault Act). He argues thаt § 10-4-718(1), C.R.S.2000, denies insurers the right of recovery for benefits paid pursuant to § 10-4-706, C.R.S.2000, and thus, he cannot be required to pay thesе amounts to the insurer as restitution in this criminal case.
Restitution to the victim or victims for actual damages sustained is rеquired as a condition of a sentence to probation in erimi-nal cases. Section 16-11-204.5(1), CRS. 2000. Restitution as a condition of probation is as much a part of a criminal sentence as a fine or other penalty. Pеople v. Milne,
At the time of defendant's sentencing, the restitution statute defined "victim," in pertinent part, as:
the party immediately and directly aggrieved by а defendant, who is convicted of a criminal act and who is granted probation, as well as others who havе suffered *1240 losses because of a contractual relationship with such party ....
Colo. Sess. Laws 1985, ch. 140, § 16-11-204.5(4) at 630. (emрhasis added)
Therefore, the restitution statute on its face allows for recovery of the losses claimed by the victim's insurer. See People v. Smith,
The prоvisions of the No Fault Act do not conflict with the statutory mandate for the payment of restitution in criminal cases. The No-Fault Act was designed to limit recovery in tort to losses falling outside PIP coverage. See Peterson v. Kester,
The No-Fault Act is thus addressed to actions in tort, and the prоvisions of that Act do not in any way address the issue of restitution in eriminal cases. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the statutes are not in conflict because they do not address the same subjects. Cf. Stjernholm v. Colorado State Board of Chiropractic Examiners,
Defendant's reliance upon People v. T.R.,
Contrary to defendаnt's argument, the issue in People v. T.R., supra, turned on the interpretation of the juvenile restitution statute, not the prоvisions of the No-Fault Act. The juvenile restitution statute specifically required payment to insurers deriving their right of reсovery from the rights of the vie-tim. Thus, as the victim in that case would have had no right of recovery under § 10-4-713(1) of the No-Fault Act, the insurer had no subrogation rights for repayment of PIP benefits. As a result, the restitution statute provided no basis for reсovery of funds by that insurer.
However, the division in People v. T.R., supra, specifically noted the difference between the juvenile restitution statute and the "adult" restitution statute, § 16-11-204.5, C.R.S.2000. The adult statute was and is not limited to situations involving partiеs subro-gated to the rights of others. Rather, the adult statute defines "victim" for purposes of restitution as requiring only a contractual relationship between the injured victim and the other party or parties. See § 16-18.5-102(4)(a)(III), C.R.S.2000. The adult stаtute provides for restitution to be made to the directly aggrieved party, as well as other parties suffering a loss based on contract.
To the extent that People v. T.R., supra, may be read to require a different rеsult than that we reach here, we decline to follow it.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to set aside the restitution order.
We reject defendant's remaining contentions as being without merit.
The order is affirmed.