People v. O'Neal
2016 IL App (1st) 132284
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- On May 29, 2010, at a street party on a one-way street dividing rival gangs, Jauan O’Neal (acting as party “security”) fired multiple shots at a van driving the wrong way; a bullet struck and killed his friend Darius Murphy, who was across the street in a parked car.
- The State charged O’Neal with multiple murder counts: intentional murder, strong-probability murder, and felony murder predicated on aggravated discharge of a firearm; jurors were instructed on self-defense and second-degree murder (imperfect self-defense) for the intentional/strong-probability counts.
- The jury found O’Neal guilty of felony murder, reduced the intentional and strong-probability counts to second-degree murder (unreasonable belief in need of self-defense), and convicted him of aggravated discharge of a firearm; the trial court sentenced him on the felony murder count.
- Defense argued (pretrial and in a post-trial motion) that aggravated discharge could not serve as the predicate felony because the act underlying that felony was the same act that caused the death, and the jury had effectively found imperfect self-defense.
- The appellate court reversed the felony-murder conviction, affirmed the second-degree murder and aggravated-discharge convictions, and remanded for resentencing, concluding the predicate felony was inherent in the killing and O’Neal lacked an independent felonious purpose separate from the killing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether aggravated discharge of a firearm can serve as the predicate felony for felony murder when the charged shooting was the same act that caused the death | The State argued aggravated discharge was a proper predicate felony and felony murder could stand | O’Neal argued the discharge was the same act that caused the death and thus cannot be a predicate felony (same-act / Morgan line) | Reversed felony-murder conviction: the discharge was inherent in the killing and could not serve as the predicate felony |
| Whether the defendant acted with an independent felonious purpose separate from the killing | The State maintained the felonious purpose of shooting at the van (rival gang) was independent of killing the bystander | O’Neal contended his purpose in shooting was directed at the van and not an independent felony as to Murphy; jury found imperfect self-defense | Held no independent felonious purpose proved; felonious purpose not independent of the murder |
| Whether jury verdicts (felony murder and second-degree murder) were legally inconsistent | State defended both convictions as permissible | Defense argued the verdicts were inconsistent because jury found imperfect self-defense on other counts but still convicted felony murder | Court rendered inconsistency moot by reversing felony murder; did not reach further inconsistency analysis |
| Whether instructing that one “is not justified in the use of force if he is committing aggravated discharge” improperly curtailed self-defense | State relied on pattern instruction and argued it correctly reflected law that forcible felonies are not justified | O’Neal argued the instruction prevented the jury from considering self-defense for the shooting | Instruction was not reversible error: jury received definitional and issues instructions showing State had to disprove justification to prove aggravated discharge; no plain error found |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404 (Ill. 2001) (predicate felony cannot be one that is inherent in and arises out of the murder itself)
- People v. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d 434 (Ill. 2003) (same-act principle precludes using predicate felony that is the same act as the killing)
- People v. Davis, 213 Ill. 2d 459 (Ill. 2004) (mob-action predicate proper where evidence of separate conduct supported the predicate felony apart from the killing)
- People v. Davison, 236 Ill. 2d 232 (Ill. 2010) (reaffirmed dual inquiry: (1) whether predicate felony is inherent in murder and (2) whether defendant had an independent felonious purpose)
- People v. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187 (Ill. 2003) (describing purpose of felony-murder statute to deter violent forcible felonies)
- People v. Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d 502 (Ill. 1983) (armed-violence cannot be predicated on voluntary manslaughter because it would subvert manslaughter doctrine)
- People v. Drakeford, 139 Ill. 2d 206 (Ill. 1990) (applying Alejos reasoning to bar using aggravated battery as predicate where jury convicted of second-degree murder)