240 Cal. App. 4th 402
Cal. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant Garyon Nettles is serving an indeterminate 25-to-life under California’s Three Strikes law based on a 1998 conviction; two of his prior strikes (1985 pleas) were for assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220).
- The 1985 plea colloquy admitted violent facts (beatings, fractured skulls, removal/attempted removal of victims’ clothing) supporting force/violence in the offenses.
- Proposition 36 (Three Strikes Reform Act) took effect November 7, 2012 and created a resentencing procedure under Penal Code § 1170.126 for some third‑strike inmates.
- § 1170.126 disqualifies inmates from resentencing if they have prior convictions for offenses that “appear” in specified clauses, including a ‘‘sexually violent offense’’ as defined by Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(b).
- Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(b), as of November 7, 2012, included assault with intent to commit rape as a sexually violent offense; the trial court denied Nettles’s § 1170.126 petition on that basis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether disqualification under § 1170.126 should be determined as of the Act’s effective date or the date of the original sentence | Plaintiff: Determination is as of the Act’s effective date; statutes use present tense and parallel sentencing/resentencing structure | Nettles: Disqualification should be measured as of his 1998 sentence (when assault with intent to commit rape allegedly was not listed as sexually violent) | Court: Held determination is as of Nov. 7, 2012; assault w/ intent to commit rape was a disqualifying sexually violent offense on that date. |
| Whether assault with intent to commit rape qualifies as a "sexually violent offense" for Nettles’s prior convictions | Plaintiff: W&I § 6600(b) (as of 2012) includes § 220 when committed by force or violence, so prior convictions qualify | Nettles: The statute should be construed in his favor (rule of lenity) because of retrospective effect | Court: Rejected lenity claim; statutory language is unambiguous and disqualifying offense appeared in controlling law on Nov. 7, 2012. |
| Whether the record sufficiently establishes the prior strikes were sexually violent in nature | Plaintiff: Court may examine the record of conviction (including plea colloquy/prosecutor’s factual statement) to determine force/violence | Nettles: Determination should be made from statutory categories alone, not the plea record | Court: Held the plea colloquy and record of conviction properly established the force/violence element; evidence is sufficient. |
| Whether Nettles had a right to a jury trial on the § 1170.126 disqualification question | Plaintiff: Facts establishing prior convictions are prior-conviction exceptions and do not require jury findings | Nettles: Entitled to jury to decide whether prior convictions qualify as sexually violent | Court: Held no jury right; § 1170.126 resentencing is a discretionary reduction proceeding and does not implicate Sixth Amendment jury requirement. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Johnson, 61 Cal.4th 674 (Cal. 2015) (classification for resentencing is determined by law as of Proposition 36’s effective date)
- People v. Yearwood, 213 Cal.App.4th 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (summary of § 1170.126 eligibility criteria)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (U.S. 2010) (sentence-reduction proceedings do not trigger Sixth Amendment jury findings)
- People v. Superior Court (Kaulick), 215 Cal.App.4th 1279 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (resentencing under § 1170.126 does not implicate Sixth Amendment jury requirement)
- People v. Guerrero, 44 Cal.3d 343 (Cal. 1988) (trier of fact may consider entire record of conviction to determine truth of prior-conviction allegations)
- People v. Guilford, 228 Cal.App.4th 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (court may consult record of conviction in § 1170.126 determinations)