People v. Nelson CA2/1
B334415M
| Cal. Ct. App. | Feb 28, 2025Background
- Sergio Dujuan Nelson was convicted in 1995 of two counts of first-degree murder, with special circumstances and firearm enhancements, for killings committed when he was 19 years old.
- Nelson was initially sentenced to death, but the California Supreme Court reversed the death sentence in 2016 due to insufficient evidence on the “lying in wait” special circumstance.
- Upon resentencing, Nelson received life without parole (LWOP) for one count and a consecutive sentence for the second count with firearm enhancements.
- Nelson filed a motion for a "Franklin hearing" to preserve mitigating evidence for a potential future youth offender parole hearing, arguing he was under 26 at the time of the offense.
- The trial court denied the motion, finding he was not eligible because he was over 18 at the time of the crime and sentenced to LWOP; Nelson appealed that denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eligibility for Franklin hearing and youth parole | Not eligible due to age and LWOP sentence per statute | Exclusion violates equal protection and is cruel/unusual punishment | Statutory exclusion is constitutional |
| Equal Protection Violation | Rational basis to distinguish juveniles and adults for parole | Adults under 26 should get same benefits as juveniles | No equal protection violation; rational |
| Cruel or Unusual Punishment | Sentence legal under current law and prior rulings | Legislature's parole distinctions make his sentence cruel/unusual | Punishment not cruel or unusual |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Nelson, 1 Cal.5th 513 (Cal. 2016) (reversed death sentence due to trial errors and insufficient special circumstance evidence)
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (Cal. 2016) (youth offenders entitled to create records for future parole hearings)
- In re Cook, 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cal. 2019) (limits and procedures for Franklin hearings)
- People v. Hardin, 15 Cal.5th 834 (Cal. 2024) (rejecting similar equal protection argument regarding youth parole)
