People v. Muhammad CA4/1, D066995

Background

Defendant Kareem Muhammad was convicted by a jury of attempted robbery (Pen. Code §§ 211 & 664), pandering by procuring (§ 266i), and pimping (§ 266h(a)); a human-trafficking count was dismissed at the close of the prosecution's case. In bifurcated proceedings the court found a prior serious felony/strike for attempted robbery. Aggregate sentence: 14 years 4 months (with one count stayed under § 654).
Facts relevant to both prosecutions occurred within a two-month window: a masked man attempted to rob a Radio Shack in July 2013 and witnesses/ surveillance tied a silver Dodge/Dodge Magnum station wagon to that incident; that same vehicle and Muhammad appeared in vice investigations into pimping/pandering in June–August 2013.
Vice detectives arrested Muhammad, his brother Elijah, and two women (Willis and Lyles) after undercover operations and hotel surveillance; text messages, Facebook posts/videos, tattoos, and recorded jail calls were offered to show pimping/pandering activity and control over the women.
Lyles initially implicated Muhammad in the robbery and in pimping-related conduct, later recanted at trial saying she had been drunk and fabricated parts of her statements; prosecution presented evidence of jail calls in which Muhammad urged Lyles to assert Fifth Amendment rights and to avoid cooperating.
Trial court granted the People’s motion to consolidate the robbery and the pimping/pandering matters as "connected in their commission," denied Muhammad’s untimely day-of-trial Faretta-style request to represent himself, and imposed a $39 fine under § 1202.5 which the People conceded was unauthorized for attempted (as opposed to completed) theft offenses.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court erred by consolidating attempted robbery with pimping/pandering charges	Joinder proper because offenses were connected in their commission, shared elements (coercion/force), and evidence (witness testimony, vehicle ID, and impeachment evidence) would be cross-admissible	Consolidation was prejudicial: the pimping video and related evidence would inflame the jury and bolster a weak robbery case; severance required to avoid unfair prejudice	Affirmed: court acted within discretion; cross-admissibility and common element (coercion) justified joinder; no substantial probability of unfair prejudice
Whether trial court erred by denying defendant’s day-of-trial motion to represent himself	N/A (People opposed delay and emphasized orderly proceedings)	Faretta right: defendant asserted desire to self-represent and requested 30–45 days to prepare; claimed disagreement with counsel on strategy	Affirmed: motion untimely; court reasonably weighed factors (quality of counsel, stage of proceedings, potential disruption) and denied under established precedent
Whether the § 1202.5 $39 fine for theft-related assessment was authorized for attempted robbery	People conceded § 1202.5 applies only to enumerated completed theft offenses listed in the statute	Muhammad argued the fine was unauthorized because attempted robbery is not among § 1202.5’s enumerated offenses	Modified judgment: $39 fine stricken; remainder of judgment affirmed

Key Cases Cited

People v. Scott, 61 Cal.4th 363 (joinder/severance standard; factors to weigh when denying severance)
People v. Merriman, 60 Cal.4th 1 (appellate standard for reviewing severance rulings)
Alcala v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.4th 1205 (section 954 and joinder of offenses having common element)
People v. Leney, 213 Cal.App.3d 265 (offenses "connected in their commission" includes shared important elements)
People v. Scott, 52 Cal.4th 452 (cross-admissibility normally dispels prejudice in joinder context)
People v. Soper, 45 Cal.4th 759 (absence of cross-admissibility not dispositive; other severance factors must be weighed)
People v. Lynch, 50 Cal.4th 693 (timeliness rule for Faretta/self-representation motions)
People v. Valdez, 32 Cal.4th 73 (day-of-trial or moments-before-trial waiver of counsel may be untimely)
People v. Ruiz, 142 Cal.App.3d 780 (need to deny tardy self-representation requests to prevent disruption/delay)
People v. Mancebo, 27 Cal.4th 735 (treatment of fines/assessments under statutory authority)
People v. Smith, 24 Cal.4th 849 (statutory construction re fines where statute enumerates covered offenses)