People v. Mosley
60 Cal. 4th 1044
Cal.2015Background
- Defendant Steven Mosley (charged with lewd act on a minor) was acquitted of the felony sexual offense but convicted of misdemeanor simple assault; the trial judge nonetheless found the assault was sexually motivated and ordered him to register as a sex offender under Penal Code § 290.006.
- Proposition 83 (Jessica’s Law) added Penal Code § 3003.5(b), making it unlawful for any person required to register as a sex offender to reside within 2,000 feet of a school or park where children gather.
- The Court of Appeal struck Mosley’s registration order under Apprendi v. New Jersey, concluding the Jessica’s Law residency restriction is punitive and required jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The People appealed to the California Supreme Court, which granted review and considered whether Apprendi invalidates a judge-imposed registration order insofar as it exposes the registrant to Jessica’s Law residency restrictions.
- The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal: it held Apprendi did not bar judge-found predicate facts for discretionary registration and that (1) Ice narrows Apprendi where no historical jury role exists; (2) Jessica’s Law residency restrictions are not facially punitive under Mendoza‑Martinez; and (3) even if residency restrictions required jury findings, the nonpunitive registration order would survive separately.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mosley) | Defendant's Argument (People) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Apprendi requires jury findings for judge-imposed sex-offender registration when Jessica’s Law residency restrictions attach | Apprendi requires jury findings because the residency restriction is punitive and increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum | Apprendi does not apply because (a) Ice limits Apprendi where there is no historical jury role, and (b) §3003.5(b) is regulatory or inapplicable to non‑parolees | Apprendi does not invalidate the registration order: Ice controls (no historic jury role), residency rules are not facially punitive, and registration remains valid even if residency rules were unenforceable |
| Whether the §3003.5(b) residency restriction is punishment for Sixth Amendment/Apprendi purposes | Residency zones are punitive (resembles banishment, property deprivation, severe liberty restraints) and thus require jury findings | The restrictions are regulatory, aimed at public safety, not traditional punishment; any burdens are not so punitive on their face to override legislative intent | The court held §3003.5(b) is not facially punitive under Mendoza‑Martinez and Smith v. Doe; rational regulatory purpose and lack of traditional punitive attributes weigh against labeling it punishment |
| If residency restrictions were punitive, whether the registration order must be vacated entirely | The judge-found registration (and attendant restrictions) increased punishment beyond the jury verdict so order must be struck | Even if residency restrictions cannot be applied without jury findings, the registration requirement itself is nonpunitive and may stand as a separate regulatory measure | The court held the registration order is separable and remains valid even if attendant residency restrictions could not constitutionally be applied without jury findings |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Sixth Amendment requires jury finding of any fact that increases penalty beyond prescribed statutory maximum)
- Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) (Apprendi’s scope limited where historical jury role is absent; judges may make certain sentencing factfindings)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (Alaska sex‑offender registration is nonpunitive; Mendoza‑Martinez factors govern punishment analysis)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (multi‑factor test to decide whether a statutory scheme is punitive in purpose or effect)
- Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343 (2012) (Apprendi applies to substantial criminal fines; historical jury role informs scope of jury right)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (death‑penalty aggravating findings must be jury‑found under Apprendi principle)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (statutory maximum defined by facts in jury verdict or admitted facts)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (federal sentencing guidelines invalidated to the extent they permitted judicial factfinding that increased sentences)
- Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (California’s upper‑term sentencing rule violated Sixth Amendment by permitting judge‑found facts to increase sentence)
- People v. Picklesimer, 48 Cal.4th 330 (2010) (California precedent recognizing sex‑offender registration itself is nonpunitive and not subject to Apprendi jury‑finding requirement)