People v. Morocho
132 N.E.3d 806
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- Defendant Wilson Morocho sent multiple threatening text messages (in Spanish) to the mother of his child on Aug. 25, 2014, including a photo of a knife; police later arrested him and recovered a similar knife.
- Victim reported emotional distress and a coworker and troopers corroborated the texts and a bruise on the victim’s arm; defendant admitted sending the texts but said he did not intend to carry out threats.
- Defendant was tried in a bench trial, convicted of three counts of aggravated stalking, and sentenced to four years; two counts relied on 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1) and one count on 12-7.3(a)(2).
- Defendant appealed, challenging the facial constitutionality of subsection (a)(2), which criminalized knowingly threatening a person two or more times where the threats would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress (distinct from fear for safety).
- The appellate court analyzed whether subsection (a)(2) falls within established First Amendment exceptions (true threats, speech integral to criminal conduct) and whether it is overbroad.
- The court held subsection (a)(2) facially overbroad and unconstitutional and reversed the conviction based solely on that subsection (count XXI); convictions based on subsection (a)(1) remained for remand to enter judgment and sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(2) is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment | Subsection (a)(2) survived prior scrutiny and criminalizes threats that cause emotional distress; it fits within the statute’s legitimate sweep | Subsection (a)(2) is overbroad and criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech (threats of lawful action, political/business speech) | Subsection (a)(2) is facially overbroad and unconstitutional |
| Whether (a)(2) fits into the “true threats” exception to the First Amendment | The threats here are unprotected and can be prosecuted as stalking | The statute lacks the element of threatening unlawful violence and therefore is not limited to true threats | (a)(2) does not require threats of unlawful violence and does not fit the true-threats exception |
| Whether subsection (d)(2) (free speech/assembly exemption) cures overbreadth | The exemption protects lawful speech and prevents unwarranted prosecutions | The exemption is an affirmative defense raised at trial and does not cure chilling effect | (d)(2) does not cure the statute’s chilling effect and cannot save (a)(2) from overbreadth |
| Remedy for convictions predicated on (a)(2) | Uphold conviction or limit remedy | Vacate convictions based on unconstitutional subsection | Vacated defendant’s aggravated-stalking conviction under (a)(2); remanded for judgment/sentencing on remaining valid counts |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warning and waiver principles)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (true-threats definition)
- Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (mens rea for true threats)
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (robust protection for public debate)
- Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (limits on content-based restrictions)
- United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (broad First Amendment protections)
- People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210 (speech integral to criminal conduct exception)
- People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872 (remedy when conviction rests on unconstitutional statute)
- People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (struck portion of stalking statute as overbroad; distinguished the “threatens” provision)