People v. Morger, 2019 IL 123643

Conrad Morger (born 1992) was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and criminal sexual abuse for sexual acts with his teenage sister; evaluator rated him a moderate-to-high risk to reoffend but suitable for community treatment.
The McLean County circuit court imposed a four-year probation with 18 conditions, including mandatory subsection (a)(8.9) of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections banning access to or use of "social networking websites."
Other statutory probation conditions included (a)(8.7) (no internet contact with persons defendant reasonably believes are under 18), (a)(11) (no use of computer-scrub software), and discretionary (b)(18) (extensive monitoring and approval of Internet-capable device use).
Morger challenged the social-media ban as facially overbroad under the First Amendment; the appellate court upheld the conditions, relying in part on Packingham v. North Carolina and reasoning that probation supervision may justify restrictions.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted review under the public-interest mootness exception and considered whether subsection (a)(8.9) is a content-neutral restriction that survives intermediate scrutiny and the "reasonableness" test for probation conditions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether mandatory statutory probation condition (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(a)(8.9)) banning access to social networking websites is facially overbroad under the First Amendment	State: the ban is a reasonable, protective condition related to preventing sex offenses and rehabilitation; probationers have diminished rights while serving sentence	Morger: the flat, exception-free ban prohibits lawful, protected speech and is not narrowly tailored as required by Packingham and intermediate scrutiny	Court: (a)(8.9) is facially overbroad and unconstitutional; vacated that probation condition, but left other conditions intact

Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. _ (2017) (social media is the modern public square; blanket bans on access implicate First Amendment and must be narrowly tailored)
In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50 (2003) (probation conditions that waive constitutional rights must be narrowly drawn and reasonable)
People v. Minnis, 2016 IL 119563 (2016) (intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral restrictions in probation context)
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (2017) (definition and test for facial overbreadth under First Amendment)
People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776 (2014) (overbreadth analysis and relation to statute's legitimate sweep)
United States v. Burroughs, 613 F.3d 233 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (vacating broad Internet restrictions where defendant did not use Internet to facilitate offense)
United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2018) (post-Packingham guidance that blanket Internet restrictions on supervised release are rarely sufficiently tailored)