2018 IL App (4th) 170285
Ill. App. Ct.2018Background
- Conrad Morger was convicted in 2014 of criminal sexual abuse and aggravated criminal sexual abuse for offenses against his minor sister and was sentenced to 180 days in jail and 48 months’ probation.
- On initial appeal the convictions were affirmed but the appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded because the trial court had improperly delegated the setting of specific probation conditions to the county court services department.
- On remand the trial court resentenced Morger to probation and itself imposed specific probation conditions; Morger moved to reconsider and appealed the new conditions after the motion was denied.
- Morger contended (1) that imposing new conditions on remand impermissibly increased his sentence and (2) that six specific probation conditions (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14) were overly broad, unreasonable, and unconstitutional.
- The Fourth District affirmed: (1) the trial court properly resentenced and imposed conditions on remand (no improper sentence increase), and (2) each challenged condition was reasonable and did not violate constitutional limits as applied to a probationer.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court’s imposition of probation conditions on remand impermissibly increased defendant’s sentence | State: remand required the trial court to reimpose conditions; court retained authority to impose/modify probation | Morger: reimposing conditions on remand amounts to an improper sentence increase (relying on Castleberry/Daily) | The court held remand was corrective of the trial court’s prior improper delegation; resentencing by the trial court did not impermissibly increase the sentence. |
| Whether probation condition Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14 are unreasonable/overbroad or unconstitutional | State: each condition is reasonably related to offense/rehabilitation and public protection; probationers have diminished but not extinguished constitutional rights; conditions allow probation officer exceptions | Morger: conditions are overly broad, hamper rehabilitation, and violate First Amendment and due process (relies on Packingham and federal decisions limiting Internet restrictions) | The court held each challenged condition was reasonably related to the sexual-offense convictions, appropriately tailored for public protection/rehabilitation of a probationer, and constitutional in the probation context. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916 (supreme court decision limiting appellate courts from increasing sentences on appeal)
- Meyer v. People, 176 Ill. 2d 372 (Ill. 1997) (probation conditions that humiliate or stigmatize are invalid)
- People v. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50 (Ill. 2003) (probation conditions must be reasonable and related to offense or rehabilitation)
- People v. Goossens, 2015 IL 118347 (Ill. 2015) (probation conditions that protect public may constitutionally restrict certain rights of probationers)
- Knights v. United States, 534 U.S. 112 (U.S. 2001) (probationers have diminished constitutional rights; reasonable conditions may deprive some freedoms)
- Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (U.S. 2017) (statutory blanket ban on registered sex offenders’ access to social media unconstitutional)
- Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (U.S. 1987) (probation is conditional liberty subject to restrictions imposed for public safety)