People v. Morfin
2012 IL App (1st) 103568
Ill. App. Ct.2012Background
- Morfin convicted of two counts of first-degree murder; sentenced to two concurrent natural-life terms in 1998 after trial in 1997.
- Defendant was 17 at the time of offenses and was tried on an accountability theory for multiple murders.
- Illinois statute 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) mandatorily imposed natural life for more than one murder; Miller held this unconstitutional as applied to a juvenile in Miller v. Alabama.
- Morfin challenged his sentence via a 2-1401 petition arguing the life sentence could not be imposed on a minor and contends Miller applies retroactively.
- Circuit court dismissed the 2-1401 petition as barred by res judicata; the appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with Miller; Morfin now seeks resentencing options beyond natural life.
- This decision remands for a new sentencing hearing with available ranges: 20–60 years, up to 100 years with extended-term finding, or natural life.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively on collateral review | Morfin contends Miller applies retroactively | State argues Miller is new law not retroactive on collateral review | Yes; Miller retroactively applicable on collateral review |
| Whether Miller renders Morfin’s sentence void ab initio | Miller voids mandatory life for minors | Miller does not void the sentence for Morfin | No; Miller requires a new sentencing hearing, not void ab initio |
| Whether Teague retroactivity analysis governs Miller here | Teague analysis should apply to retroactivity | Teague governs retroactivity, but Miller changed substantive law | Teague analysis used; Miller found retroactive as a substantive rule |
| What remedy the court must provide after Miller retroactivity | Must resentence under Miller with range alternatives | Remand not required to alter already-imposed sentence | Remand for sentencing consistent with Miller (20–60, up to 100 with extended term, or life) |
| Scope of Miller retroactivity to Illinois accountability-based murders | Miller applies broadly to juveniles sentenced under accountability | Miller limited by whether offender was juvenile and degree of involvement | Applicable; requires new sentencing hearing with Miller-compliant options |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; retroactive on collateral review; requires sentencing hearing with broader range of options)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity framework for new rules on collateral review; two exceptions)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (substantive rules not subject to Teague bar; severity of punishment and discretion concerns)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (restricted juvenile capital punishment; informs youth culpability considerations)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (bar against mandatory life without parole for nonhomicide offenses by juveniles; contextual relevance to youth penalties)
- Davis, 388 Ill. App. 3d 869 (2009) (Illinois postconviction retroactivity analysis; distinguishes Miller on collateral review)
- Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 111145 (2012) (Miller retroactivity on collateral review; sentencing remand guidance)