55 Cal.App.5th 1016
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- In 2015, 18‑year‑old Giovanny Montelongo stabbed and killed 15‑year‑old Keshawn Brooks during an attempted taking of Brooks’s backpack and football bag.
- Police arrested Montelongo; a jury convicted him of robbery and first‑degree (felony) murder and found the robbery‑murder special circumstance true under Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17).
- The trial court sentenced Montelongo to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) on the murder count plus one year for a weapon enhancement, and imposed a $10,000 restitution fine and routine court assessments.
- Montelongo argued on appeal that the felony‑murder special circumstance is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him; that LWOP is cruel and unusual because the court did not adequately consider his youth at age 18; and that the court failed to consider his ability to pay fines and assessments.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentence, rejected the constitutional challenges, held Montelongo forfeited ability‑to‑pay challenges to the fines/assessments, but directed the trial court to strike an erroneously listed parole‑revocation fine from the minute order and abstract of judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Montelongo) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vagueness of felony‑murder special circumstance (§ 190.2(a)(17)) | Statute is facially clear and prosecutorial choice between overlapping statutes is permitted. | Overlap between felony‑murder and special‑circumstance murder gives prosecutors arbitrary power to select LWOP vs. parole‑eligible punishment. | Rejected: overlapping statutes are permissible if conduct is proscribed with fair notice; no claim of discriminatory prosecution. |
| Eighth Amendment challenge to LWOP for 18‑year‑old | LWOP lawful where statutes mandate it for special‑circumstance murder; Miller line (under 18) controls. | Court must apply Miller factors to 18‑year‑old; neuroscience supports extending Miller protections beyond 18. | Rejected: Miller and its progeny are limited to offenders under 18; appellate court bound by Supreme Court/Legislature; sentence not cruel and unusual as a matter of controlling precedent. |
| Ability to pay restitution fine and assessments | Court may impose restitution fine above minimum after considering ability to pay; assessments lawful when challenged timely. | Trial court imposed $10,000 restitution fine and assessments without considering ability to pay. | Forfeited: Montelongo failed to object below or present inability‑to‑pay evidence, so appellate challenge is forfeited. |
| Parole‑revocation fine listed in minute order/abstract | N/A (People concede error) | Parole‑revocation fine invalid because LWOP makes parole impossible; fine should be stricken. | Held: clerical error—strike the parole‑revocation fine from minute order and abstract of judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for offenders under 18 unconstitutional; courts must consider youth‑related factors)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty categorically barred for offenders under 18; established 18 as line for juvenile death‑penalty eligibility)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile offenders unconstitutional; juveniles have diminished culpability)
- Batchelder v. United States, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (prosecutor may choose among overlapping statutes that proscribe same conduct)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (vagueness doctrine requires penal statutes give fair notice and not encourage arbitrary enforcement)
- People v. Winbush, 2 Cal.5th 402 (2017) (robbery special‑circumstance statute not unconstitutionally vague)
- People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014) (Miller factors and sentencing considerations for juvenile offenders)
- People v. Green, 27 Cal.3d 1 (1980) (independent felonious purpose rule for felony‑murder special circumstances)
- People v. Riccardi, 54 Cal.4th 758 (2012) (explaining scope of felony‑murder special‑circumstance and independent‑purpose principle)
- People v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019) (ability‑to‑pay requirement for certain fines and procedural due‑process concerns)