People v. Minnis, 2016 IL 119563

Background

Mark Minnis, adjudicated a delinquent minor for criminal sexual abuse (2010), was required to register as a sex offender and to disclose Internet identities and websites under 730 ILCS 150/3(a).
Minnis listed email addresses and a Facebook account on earlier registrations; he omitted Facebook on his August 2014 registration but officers observed recent Facebook activity and charged him with failing to register that Internet site.
Minnis moved to dismiss, arguing section 3(a)’s Internet-disclosure requirement was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague under the First Amendment; the trial court granted the motion on overbreadth grounds.
The State appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court; amici (ACLU Illinois and EFF) supported Minnis.
The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed whether Minnis had standing to bring a facial overbreadth challenge and whether the Internet-disclosure provision violated the First Amendment; the Court reversed the trial court and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Minnis)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Standing to challenge entire §3(a) (identities + websites)	Minnis may bring a facial First Amendment overbreadth challenge to the whole Internet-disclosure provision because registration creates a credible, ongoing threat of prosecution that chills speech.	State: Minnis was charged only for failing to register a website (Facebook) so court lacked jurisdiction to rule on identities portion.	Court: Minnis has standing to facially challenge the entire Internet-disclosure provision under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.
Whether §3(a) triggers First Amendment scrutiny	Minnis: Disclosure of Internet identities and sites chills anonymous online speech and is subject to First Amendment review.	State: Requirement is largely retroactive and therefore speculative as a burden on anonymity; it does not eliminate anonymous speech.	Court: The provision affects constitutionally protected anonymous Internet speech and warrants First Amendment scrutiny.
Level of scrutiny (content-based vs content-neutral)	Minnis/amici: Requirement is content-based and should receive strict scrutiny because it targets speakers (sex offenders) whose speech may be chilled.	State: Provision is content-neutral—aimed at safety/public protection, not regulating speech based on content—so intermediate scrutiny applies.	Court: Provision is content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Overbreadth under intermediate scrutiny	Minnis: Provision is substantially overbroad (applies to juveniles, all offenders without individualized risk assessment, covers speech unrelated to public safety), chilling more speech than necessary.	State: The disclosure advances the substantial interest of protecting the public from recidivist sex offenders; it is narrowly tailored (retroactive, limited to identities/sites used) and not substantially overbroad.	Court: The disclosure provision survives intermediate scrutiny—it advances a substantial government interest and is not substantially overbroad.

Key Cases Cited

De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (First Amendment applies to states via Fourteenth Amendment)
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (states may protect children from sexual exploitation; substantial government interest)
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (protections for anonymous speech)
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (First Amendment protections apply fully to the Internet)
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (overbreadth doctrine—chilling effect justification)
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (registration/notification scheme’s purpose is public safety; publicity consequences collateral)
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations)
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (compelled identification and prior restraints implicate anonymity concerns)
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (restrictions on anonymous political speech)