People v. McDonald
154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823
Cal. Ct. App.2013Background
- January 2008 SVPA petition sought indeterminate commitment for John McDonald; trial held January 2011; court committed him to the DMH in a secured facility for an indeterminate term.
- McDonald appeals from the commitment order; remand proceedings in McKee I and McKee II influenced this court’s analysis.
- Evidence included Dr. Starr’s evaluations (2001, 2009, 2010) and Dr. Selby’s evaluations (2007, 2010) showing pedophilia and antisocial/borderline disorders, with abuse history dating to 1982–1983.
- McDonald’s prior offenses in 1982–1983 resulted in multiple felonies; risk assessments using Static-99R and Static-2002R placed him in highest risk categories.
- Proposition 83 amended the SVPA to indeterminate commitments; release requires petition or DMH-supported process, framing the equal-protection challenge leqly on class-wide basis.
- Waiver of McDonald’s presence at trial: orally waived; court found waiver voluntary; 977(b) applies to criminal prosecutions but not SVPA proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SVPA indeterminate commitment violates equal protection | McDonald argues SVPA burden is harsher than MDOs/NGIs with no justification. | State contends McKee II justified disparate treatment for SVPs as a class. | Affirmed: classwide equal-protection justification sustained. |
| Whether McKee II used the correct de novo standard of review | McDonald claims defense evidence ignored; argues improper standard. | State asserts de novo review consistent with McKee II’s framework. | Correct standard applied; review was independent and legal-resolved. |
| Whether the McKee II court applied strict scrutiny properly | McDonald contends no proper strict scrutiny analysis for indeterminate term. | State asserts two-step strict scrutiny satisfied by risk and public safety rationale. | Strict scrutiny satisfied under McKee I framework; evidence supported disparity. |
| Whether the remand evidence supported the court’s conclusions on recidivism, trauma, and treatment | McDonald argues postremand evidence did not establish necessary distinctions. | State maintains evidence supported reasonable perceptions of greater danger and treatment differences. | Yes: evidence supported the disparate treatment as reasonable and factually based. |
| Whether waiver of trial presence complied with due process | Oral waiver violated § 977(b) and due process requiring written waiver. | SVPA due process permits oral waiver; written waiver not required; harmless error to extent. | Waiver valid; any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Yartz, 37 Cal.4th 529 (Cal. 2005) (SVPA context and civil commitment framework)
- McKee I, 47 Cal.4th 117 (Cal. 2009) (established equal protection framework for indeterminate commitment)
- Landau, 214 Cal.App.4th 1 (Cal. App. 2013) (classwide equal protection acceptance of McKee II reasoning)
- McCloud, 213 Cal.App.4th 1076 (Cal. App. 2013) (supports classwide equal protection application)
- McKnight, 212 Cal.App.4th 860 (Cal. App. 2012) (affirms McKee II framework for disparate treatment analysis)
- Kisling, 199 Cal.App.4th 687 (Cal. App. 2011) (single-subject rule analysis for Prop. 83 context)
- In re Moye, 22 Cal.3d 457 (Cal. 1978) (strict scrutiny standard for equal protection challenges)