People v. McClenton CA2/4, B304917

In 1995 McClenton, then 17, was tried as an adult, convicted of multiple violent and sexual offenses, and in 1996 was sentenced to an aggregate term of 196 years (de facto LWOP).
This court affirmed the judgment in 1996; the California Supreme Court denied review and the time for certiorari expired, rendering the judgment final in December 1996.
In 2012 McClenton filed a habeas petition challenging his sentence under Blakely/Cunningham/Graham; the prosecution acknowledged he was a juvenile and that SB 260/§3051 made him eligible for a youth offender parole hearing and conceded a limited Franklin hearing was appropriate.
In 2018 the trial court denied resentencing but ordered a Franklin hearing (to put youth-related mitigation on the record); the matter remained pending in the trial court and in collateral proceedings into 2019.
In March 2019 McClenton moved under Proposition 57 for transfer to juvenile court, arguing his case was not final when Prop 57 took effect in November 2016 because his habeas petition was pending; the trial court denied the motion and this appeal followed.
The Court of Appeal affirmed: McClenton’s judgment was final in 1996, pending habeas/Franklin proceedings and eligibility for a youth-parole hearing did not render the judgment nonfinal for Prop 57 retroactivity, and no resentencing occurred to reopen finality.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether McClenton’s judgment was nonfinal when Proposition 57 took effect (so he could seek transfer to juvenile court).	Judgment was final in 1996; Prop 57 does not apply.	Pending habeas/ongoing proceedings made the case nonfinal in 2016.	Judgment was final in 1996; Prop 57 does not apply.
Whether entitlement to a youth-offender parole hearing / a Franklin proceeding renders a long-final judgment nonfinal for Prop 57 retroactivity.	Eligibility for §3051/Franklin does not reopen finality; only an actual resentencing or recall would.	Entitlement to youth-parole relief or pending Franklin hearing means the case was not final.	Eligibility or a Franklin hearing alone does not render a judgment nonfinal; resentencing would be required to reopen finality.

People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (explains Franklin hearing to develop youth-related mitigation for youth-offender parole consideration)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (holds Miller retroactive; informs juvenile sentencing relief analysis)
People v. Lara, 4 Cal.5th 299 (Proposition 57 applies retroactively to nonfinal cases)
People v. Buycks, 5 Cal.5th 857 (defines when a judgment becomes final, including certiorari period)
People v. Hargis, 33 Cal.App.5th 199 (example where judgment was not final shortly before Prop 57 took effect)
People v. Padilla, 50 Cal.App.5th 244 (resentencing via habeas rendered judgment nonfinal for Prop 57)
People v. Lopez, 56 Cal.App.5th 835 (trial court recall/resentencing can render judgment nonfinal)
People v. Garcia, 30 Cal.App.5th 316 (resentencing in collateral proceedings rendered the judgment nonfinal)
People v. Karaman, 4 Cal.4th 335 (judgment is rendered when the trial court pronounces sentence)
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (sentencing principles invoked in McClenton’s habeas)
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (sentencing principles invoked in McClenton’s habeas)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (bar on LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile offenders invoked in McClenton’s habeas)