People v. Mason
214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685
Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.2016Background
- Appellant Rebecca Mason was stopped for driving the wrong way, arrested for DUI, and taken to an Alcohol Investigation Bureau where a phlebotomist drew blood after she chose blood over breath testing.
- Officer Stromska told Mason she was “required” to submit to a chemical test and offered a blood-or-breath choice, but did not give the full statutory implied-consent admonition (i.e., consequences of refusal and lack of right to counsel before choosing).
- Mason had declined a voluntary preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) earlier. She did not verbally or physically resist the blood draw.
- The People introduced no evidence that Mason was a California-licensed driver or that she had given any express advance consent under Vehicle Code §13384.
- Trial court denied Mason’s Penal Code §1538.5 suppression motion, finding consent; the Court of Appeal reversed as to the warrantless blood draw and ordered suppression.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Mason’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the warrantless blood draw was valid as voluntary consent | Officer’s statement that she was “required” and her submission constituted voluntary consent | Mason’s submission was coerced by officer’s assertion of legal compulsion and absence of full admonition | The People failed to prove actual free and voluntary Fourth Amendment consent; suppression required |
| Whether California’s implied-consent statute (deemed/advance consent) supplies Fourth Amendment consent | Implied/"deemed" consent (and licensing paperwork) supplies advance consent, shifting focus to withdrawal | "Deemed" consent is not actual consent for Fourth Amendment purposes absent proof of express advance consent | Implied consent alone does not equal actual Fourth Amendment consent; burden remains on prosecution to prove voluntariness |
| Whether officer’s failure to give statutory admonitions is dispositive of voluntariness | Failure to recite consequences does not automatically invalidate consent; totality controls | Omission combined with assertion of requirement vitiated voluntariness under Bumper-style analysis | The omission is a relevant factor; here, combined with statement of legal requirement and arrest context, it vitiated consent |
| Whether any other exception (e.g., exigency) justifies the warrantless draw | Not argued | No exigency shown; no warrant obtained | No other exception shown; consent was the only claimed basis and it failed |
Key Cases Cited
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (refusal-of-consent where police claim authority vitiates consent)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (voluntariness of consent assessed by totality of circumstances)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (blood draw is a Fourth Amendment search)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (alcohol dissipation does not create categorical exigency)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. (limits on compelled blood tests and discussion of implied-consent consequences)
- People v. Panah, 35 Cal.4th 395 (prosecution bears burden to justify warrantless searches by consent)
- People v. Zamudio, 43 Cal.4th 327 (consent burden and voluntariness principles)
- People v. Harris, 234 Cal.App.4th 671 (upholding blood draw where implied-consent admonition sufficiently conveyed choice)
- Hughey v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 235 Cal.App.3d 752 (administrative purpose of implied consent and license sanctions)