2018 COA 62
Colo. Ct. App.2018Background
- Madison stole numerous bottles of wine from multiple liquor stores; he pleaded guilty to attempted theft in exchange for probation with restitution and an Evidence Disposition Agreement.
- The court ordered $16,514 restitution; $7,000 seized cash was paid out, leaving a balance (around $9,514 initially, later differing amounts as payments/credit changed).
- The Agreement reserved sixty-seven seized bottles to be returned to Madison only if he (1) paid restitution and (2) requested pickup within 90 days; it also stated law enforcement could dispose of items after 90 days (including destruction) and waived further notice.
- Madison failed to pay restitution and did not pick up the wine within 90 days; probation was later revoked and reinstated, and the restitution obligation remained unpaid.
- Five years after the Agreement, the sheriff moved to destroy the wine; Madison objected, arguing he held an ownership interest (via the Agreement, the UCC, conversion, or a restitution judgment lien) and sought to sell the wine to satisfy restitution. The trial court authorized destruction; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Evidence Disposition Agreement permitted destruction of the wine after Madison failed to meet its conditions | Agreement allowed law enforcement to dispose of items if not picked up within 90 days, including destruction | Agreement granted Madison ownership or at least the right to possession/sale despite nonperformance | The Agreement unambiguously required both payment and pickup within 90 days; failure allowed law enforcement to dispose, including destruction — affirmed |
| Whether the Agreement or conduct by prosecution modified or waived the 90-day deadline | Prosecution did not waive or modify the deadline; it set a new deadline at the hearing and did not lull Madison into reliance | Prosecution’s delay in disposing of the wine constituted waiver or modification of the 90-day condition | No waiver or effective modification shown; even if deadline was extended, Madison still failed to perform and court later set a new deadline; no waiver |
| Whether the UCC (§ 4-2-401) or sales principles vested title in Madison | Agreement controls parties’ rights; UCC provision on when title passes applies to sales and can be superseded by parties’ agreement | Madison became buyer/title holder under UCC upon victims’ acceptance of restitution or delivery to sheriff | UCC § 4-2-401 does not apply; victims were not sellers in a sale to Madison and parties had explicitly agreed ownership was contingent on payment — no title passed |
| Whether restitution judgment lien or conversion principles gave Madison ownership or title to the wine | A restitution judgment creates a lien against a defendant’s personal property; conversion/judicial-sale principles could transfer title once restitution is sought/assessed | The lien or conversion doctrines conferred ownership allowing Madison to control disposition or sell the wine to satisfy restitution | The wine was not Madison’s personal property until he satisfied the Agreement; lien/ conversion did not vest him with ownership absent payment — no property interest acquired |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 825 (Colo. 2000) (plea agreements interpreted as contracts; apply contract principles to plea-related agreements)
- McCary v. People, 874 P.2d 394 (Colo. 1994) (defendant bound by restitution agreement)
- People v. Barton, 174 P.3d 786 (Colo. 2008) (plea-agreement terms interpreted by their plain meaning)
- Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1999) (enforce unambiguous plea-agreement terms)
- Stewart v. People, 566 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1977) (a thief acquires no title to stolen property)
- West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037 (Colo. 2006) (thief cannot pass title to property)
- Diefenderfer v. People, 784 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1989) (appellant must identify specific grounds and supporting facts for claimed errors)