People v. Lucious
2016 IL App (1st) 141127
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- On April 5, 2013, two teenage boys (defendant Keith Lucious, age 15, and codefendant Anthony Scott, age 16) accosted Naritza Castellanos in an alley, threw her to the ground, and took two backpacks; Castellanos later identified both boys.
- Castellanos testified that the defendant pressed a gun to her temple; police recovered no firearm. Both youths later gave statements to police admitting participation; only Scott admitted saying to the victim, “Don’t make him shoot you.”
- Defendant and codefendant elected bench trials tried jointly. The trial court granted a directed finding on the armed-robbery-with-firearm count but found both guilty of aggravated robbery (indicating they conveyed they were armed) and unlawful restraint; defendant was sentenced only on aggravated robbery to five years.
- On appeal defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to admission/use of Scott’s inculpatory statement against him; he also argued merger of unlawful restraint and challenged transfer statute (latter rendered moot by acquittal of firearm armed-robbery).
- The appellate court held counsel was ineffective because the trial judge expressly relied on Scott’s statement as to Lucious’s guilt on the aggravated-robbery element (indication of being armed), and that failure to object was prejudicial; the aggravated-robbery conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
- The court also concluded the unlawful-restraint conviction merged into aggravated robbery (one-act, one-crime) and was not separately before the court because the trial court sentenced only on the greater offense.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Lucious's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility / Confrontation: whether codefendant Scott’s statement ("Don't make him shoot you") could be used against Lucious at a joint bench trial | The statement was admissible and the judge could consider all evidence; victim’s testimony plus defendant’s admission supported aggravated robbery | The statement was inadmissible as to Lucious because it was an out-of-court inculpatory statement by a codefendant and implicates Lucious without Scott testifying | Reversed: the trial court expressly relied on Scott’s statement as to Lucious; under Bruton/Lee/Duncan the use of a codefendant’s confession against a co-defendant violates confrontation principles when the court relies on it |
| Ineffective assistance for failure to object to Scott’s statement | Failure to object was reasonable to rely on presumption that judge will compartmentalize evidence at a bench trial | Counsel was deficient for not objecting once the court indicated it relied on the statement; failing to protect against a direct proof of an essential element was unreasonable | Held counsel’s performance was deficient and not a reasonable strategy under the circumstances |
| Prejudice: whether counsel’s omission created a reasonable probability of a different outcome | Other evidence (victim’s testimony; defendant’s possession of a cell phone) supported the indication-of-weapon element, so no prejudice | Scott’s statement was direct proof of the element; without it the State’s proof was weaker and a reasonable probability of a different result existed | Prejudice found; vacated aggravated-robbery conviction and remanded for new trial |
| One-act, one-crime merger of unlawful restraint into aggravated robbery | Initially contested but State conceded merger; trial court sentenced only on aggravated robbery | Unlawful restraint is a lesser-included offense and should merge into aggravated robbery | Court found merger applied; unlawful-restraint conviction not separately before court (sentence imposed only on aggravated robbery) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (codefendant confession improperly used against defendant at joint trial violates Confrontation Clause)
- Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986) (bench-trial court may not expressly rely on a codefendant’s confession as evidence of the defendant’s guilt)
- People v. Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d 400 (1988) (Illinois law condemns admission of extrajudicial statements of codefendants against a defendant)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)
- People v. Todd, 154 Ill. 2d 57 (1992) (presumption that bench trial judge will consider proper evidence only)
- People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156 (2009) (one-act, one-crime doctrine and merger of lesser-included offenses)