41 Cal.App.5th 370
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- Dolores Lucero, a Shasta Lake city councilmember, prepared and submitted pretyped declarations (signed by several petition signers) alleging a nonresident circulated recall petitions; she also submitted them to law enforcement and used them in a TRO/PI application.
- Several declarants testified they were misled by Lucero, did not read the declarations, or that the declarations contained false statements (e.g., that the circulator was alone or that they declined to sign).
- Sergeant Magrini’s investigation found declarants contradicted those parts of their declarations and that Elections Code concerns about circulation did not support Lucero’s claims.
- A jury convicted Lucero of preparing false evidence under Penal Code § 134; she was placed on probation and later granted early termination.
- On appeal Lucero raised (inter alia) statutory interpretation (§ 134 vs. perjury § 118), sufficiency, instructional errors, excluded cross-examination about a prosecutor’s comment to a witness, accomplice-corroboration, materiality, and challenges to probation conditions.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Lucero’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of § 134 to false declarations | § 134 covers any false “paper” or “other matter or thing,” including declarations offered as evidence | § 134 applies only to ‘real’ evidence or forged/inauthentic documents; perjury (§ 118) is the specific statute for false declarations | Affirmed: § 134 covers the declarations; falsity may be determined by what the item purports to depict/represent (Bamberg reasoning) |
| Williamson rule / overlap with perjury (§ 118) | Williamson does not preclude § 134 because Lucero’s conduct (preparing deceptive declarative evidence) is not covered by perjury/subornation elements as committed here | Perjury or subornation of perjury are the controlling, specific statutes; prosecution under § 134 is precluded | Affirmed: Williamson inapplicable because declarants lacked willful false-statement intent (no perjury/subornation), and punishments aren’t the typical special-vs-general mismatch |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Lucero prepared false evidence and knew falsity; materiality | Evidence (witnesses, Lucero’s own declaration, investigator interview) supports that Lucero furnished/oversaw and knew the false content and intended deceit | Insufficient: Lucero did not prepare most declarations, some statements are literally true or ambiguous, and materiality was not shown | Affirmed: Substantial evidence supports preparation, falsity, intent to deceive; materiality is not an element of § 134 |
| Exclusion of cross‑examination about prosecutor’s assurance to witness (motive/bias) | The prosecutor’s remark to Lukens (that he did not intend to prosecute) did not amount to a formal deal; error in excluding related cross was harmless because other evidence was cumulative | Defense was entitled to probe prosecutor’s statement to show Lukens had incentive to conform testimony; exclusion violated confrontation rights | Court: Exclusion was error but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (testimony was cumulative and corroborated) |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Bamberg, 175 Cal.App.4th 618 (Cal. Ct. App.) (photographs and other items are “false” under § 134 when offered as representing something they do not)
- People v. Morrison, 191 Cal.App.4th 1551 (Cal. Ct. App.) (§ 134 applies to prepared false biological sample)
- People v. Bhasin, 176 Cal.App.4th 461 (Cal. Ct. App.) (one who supplies false information that produces an official document may be liable under § 134)
- People v. Laws, 120 Cal.App.3d 1022 (Cal. Ct. App.) (receipt procured to falsely show restitution can violate § 134)
- In re Williamson, 43 Cal.2d 651 (Cal. 1954) (rule on when a special statute precludes prosecution under a general statute)
- People v. Murphy, 52 Cal.4th 81 (Cal.) (modern exposition of Williamson rule tests)
- People v. Cockburn, 109 Cal.App.4th 1151 (Cal. Ct. App.) (Williamson rule and sentencing comparison analysis)
- Kobrin v. People, 11 Cal.4th 416 (Cal.) (materiality element in perjury law)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for federal constitutional error)
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974) (Confrontation Clause: cross‑examination to reveal witness bias is constitutionally protected)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (U.S. 1986) (Confrontation Clause error analysis)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1999) (materiality is an element of certain federal fraud statutes; discussed but distinguished)