56 Cal.App.5th 936
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- In 2014 Lopez was convicted (jury) of second-degree murder under a natural-and-probable-consequences theory and sentenced to 22 years-to-life.
- Senate Bill No. 1437 (effective Jan. 1, 2019) narrowed felony-murder/natural-and-probable-consequences liability and created Penal Code § 1170.95, allowing eligible persons to petition to vacate murder convictions if they “could not be convicted” under the post‑2019 law.
- Lopez filed a § 1170.95 petition; the prosecutor conceded a prima facie showing but argued Lopez remained eligible for conviction under a still-valid implied‑malice theory. The trial court issued an order to show cause and held a hearing under § 1170.95(d)(3).
- At the hearing the prosecutor bore the statutory burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lopez was ineligible for resentencing; no new evidence was introduced beyond the trial record. The trial court denied the petition, finding the People met that burden by proving implied‑malice murder.
- Lopez appealed raising four claims: (1) Apprendi/jury right violation, (2) incorrect legal standard at the § 1170.95 hearing, (3) insufficiency of evidence for implied malice (proximate cause and mens rea), and (4) conflict of interest by counsel. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Lopez’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether Apprendi requires a jury to decide ineligibility under § 1170.95 | Apprendi does not apply because § 1170.95 proceedings are legislative resentencing, not a new criminal prosecution | Apprendi requires jury finding of murder elements before denying § 1170.95 relief | Rejected Apprendi claim: § 1170.95 proceedings are discretionary legislative relief proceedings and do not trigger the Sixth Amendment jury requirement; denial leaves original sentence intact. |
| 2. Standard of proof at the § 1170.95(d)(3) hearing (substantial‑evidence vs. proof of elements beyond a reasonable doubt) | The People (at argument) and trial court applied the beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard; People must prove each element of murder under current law beyond a reasonable doubt | Lopez argued the court used a substantial‑evidence (appellate) test and that the prosecutor need only show a reasonable jury could convict | Court held the statute expressly requires the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of murder under current law to establish ineligibility. |
| 3. Sufficiency of evidence for implied‑malice murder (proximate cause and mens rea) | The evidence (no‑good vote, gang testimony that being deemed “no good” marks one for death, violent gang culture) shows proximate causation and implied malice beyond a reasonable doubt | Lopez contended Frosty’s assault and Salazar’s independent shooting were superseding, unforeseeable intervening acts; also argued lack of proof he knew death was likely | Court held substantial evidence supported that (a) Frosty’s response and Salazar’s killing were foreseeable (dependent intervening causes) and (b) Lopez knew his conduct endangered life and acted with conscious disregard (implied malice). |
| 4. Conflict of interest from Public Defender’s prior representation of co‑defendant Salazar | No timely objection and no joint representation at the hearing; any conflict was not shown to have adversely affected counsel’s performance | Lopez claimed successive representation by Public Defender created an imputed actual conflict requiring reversal | Court rejected automatic reversal (not joint representation) and found no record evidence the public defender’s office performance was adversely affected; claim fails. |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Sixth Amendment requires jury find facts that increase punishment beyond statutory maximum)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
- People v. Cervantes, 26 Cal.4th 860 (2001) (distinguishes independent vs. dependent intervening cause for proximate causation)
- People v. Perez, 4 Cal.5th 1055 (2018) (denial of resentencing under a discretionary statutory scheme does not implicate Apprendi)
- People v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (2014) (describing pre‑SB1437 natural and probable consequences doctrine)
- People v. Lamoureux, 42 Cal.App.5th 241 (2019) (explains SB1437 amendments to §§ 188 and 189)
- People v. Duke, 55 Cal.App.5th 113 (2020) (alternative court view applying a substantial‑evidence framing to § 1170.95 ineligibility)
- People v. Cravens, 53 Cal.4th 500 (2012) (defining implied malice elements)