56 Cal.App.5th 835
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- In 2009 Lopez, who was 17 at the time of the offenses, was tried and convicted in adult court of first-degree murder and related offenses; he received an indeterminate sentence (originally 60 years to life, later reduced by an appellate ruling).
- In 2018 the CDCR Secretary recommended recall of Lopez’s sentence under Penal Code § 1170(d)(1) in light of People v. Le; the trial court recalled and in 2019 resentenced Lopez (to 50 years to life, with concurrent determinate terms).
- Lopez moved to remand the case to juvenile court for a retroactive Proposition 57 transfer hearing (arguing Lara requires retroactivity for nonfinal judgments); the trial court denied the motion, finding Proposition 57 did not apply because his original judgment was final before Proposition 57’s enactment.
- Lopez appealed the denial; the Court of Appeal reviewed whether a § 1170(d)(1) resentencing renders a prior sentence nonfinal for purposes of Proposition 57’s retroactive transfer-hearing rule.
- The Court of Appeal concluded that a § 1170(d)(1) resentencing replaces or modifies the original sentence so the new sentence is not final; applying Lara and Estrada, the court held Lopez is entitled to a retroactive juvenile transfer hearing and conditionally reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Proposition 57’s transfer-hearing rule apply retroactively when the original conviction was final but the trial court later resentences under § 1170(d)(1)? | Prop. 57 does not apply because Lopez’s original judgment was final long before Prop. 57; § 1170(d)(1) merely permits limited resentencing and does not remove finality. | Resentencing under § 1170(d)(1) recalls and replaces the original sentence, so the new sentence is not final and Lara/Estrada require retroactive application of Prop. 57. | Held for Lopez: § 1170(d)(1) resentencing renders the new sentence nonfinal; Prop. 57 applies retroactively and a transfer hearing is required. |
| Does § 1170(d)(1) merely allow reconsideration of prior sentencing choices (i.e., not a reopening for retroactivity purposes)? | § 1170(d)(1) is an exception to loss of jurisdiction but does not reopen a final judgment for retroactivity; the statute’s text limits the court to reconsidering original sentencing choices. | § 1170(d)(1) authorizes modifying the judgment and considering postconviction changes; "as if not previously sentenced" permits full consideration of intervening ameliorative law, including Prop. 57. | Held for Lopez: the statute allows modifying the judgment and considering postconviction developments; it is consistent with treating the new sentence as nonfinal. |
| Does the full-resentencing doctrine permit consideration of intervening ameliorative changes such as Prop. 57 at a § 1170(d)(1) resentencing? | Full-resentencing principles are limited to sentencing choices and do not authorize transferring to juvenile court. | Buycks and related precedent permit consideration of any pertinent circumstances arising after the original sentence, which includes ameliorative changes like Prop. 57. | Held for Lopez: full-resentencing doctrine supports consideration of Prop. 57 and the juvenile-transfer question on resentencing. |
| Do policy/finality concerns (windfalls, unequal relief) justify denying retroactivity here? | Applying Prop. 57 retroactively to those who happen to be resentenced creates unfair windfalls and departs from voter intent if they meant to limit retroactivity. | Estrada/Lara and McKenzie favor liberal retroactivity of ameliorative changes for those whose judgments are not final in relevant respects; policy concerns do not override that rule. | Held for Lopez: policy objections do not defeat Estrada/Lara retroactivity; courts should broadly apply ameliorative reforms to eligible defendants. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lara, 4 Cal.5th 299 (California Supreme Court) (Prop 57 transfer-hearing rule applies to juveniles whose judgments were not final when Prop 57 enacted)
- In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (California Supreme Court 1965) (ameliorative statutes are presumed retroactive as to nonfinal judgments)
- People v. Le, 61 Cal.4th 416 (California Supreme Court 2015) (basis for CDCR recommendation to recall sentence)
- People v. Buycks, 5 Cal.5th 857 (California Supreme Court) (full-resentencing rule permits consideration of changed circumstances)
- People v. McKenzie, 9 Cal.5th 40 (California Supreme Court) (ameliorative change may benefit defendants when later proceedings lack finality in relevant respects)
- People v. Padilla, 50 Cal.App.5th 244 (Cal. Ct. App.) (resentencing reopened sentence for Prop 57 transfer hearing)
- People v. Federico, 50 Cal.App.5th 318 (Cal. Ct. App.) (contrary view: § 1170(d)(1) resentencing does not remove finality)
- People v. Ramirez, 35 Cal.App.5th 55 (Cal. Ct. App.) (applied full-resentencing rule to require a Prop 57 transfer hearing after remand)
- People v. Jackson, 67 Cal.2d 96 (California Supreme Court) (collateral proceedings can reopen sentence for some retroactivity purposes)
- People v. Valenzuela, 7 Cal.5th 415 (California Supreme Court) (examples of issues addressed on full resentencing)