People v. Lipsett
258 Cal.Rptr.3d 903
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- Defendant Harley Lipsett, a state prisoner with a lengthy violent and institutionalized criminal history, threw liquid feces through his cell door striking a Salinas Valley State Prison officer and shouted that the officer might get Hepatitis C. Lipsett was charged with battery on a nonprisoner by a prisoner and admitted a prior serious-felony "strike."
- Lipsett initially pursued a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity defense; multiple mental-health evaluators found he understood his acts but diagnosed severe personality disorder, substance dependence, and schizophrenia-spectrum disorder; he later withdrew the insanity plea and pleaded guilty.
- At sentencing defense counsel asked the court under Penal Code § 1385 to strike Lipsett’s prior strike, emphasizing his traumatic childhood, early and sustained substance use, mental illness, and institutionalized life; the prosecutor opposed striking the strike.
- The trial court denied the motion to strike and sentenced Lipsett to six years (double the midterm). Lipsett appealed, arguing the strike should have been stricken and that denial violated due process/equal protection and the Eighth Amendment.
- Lipsett also sought remand for consideration of post‑sentencing mental‑health diversion under Penal Code § 1001.36 (enacted after his sentence), arguing the statute should apply retroactively to his nonfinal case.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed: it upheld the trial court’s discretionary refusal to strike the strike and held § 1001.36 does not apply retroactively to cases that have been adjudicated (convicted and sentenced) but are not final.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Lipsett’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Lipsett’s prior serious‑felony strike under § 1385 (and whether denial violated due process/equal protection or the Eighth Amendment) | The court reasonably declined to strike given Lipsett’s repeated violent offenses, recidivism, and public‑safety concerns | Strike should have been struck because offenses stemmed from mental illness, traumatic background, and are outside the spirit of Three Strikes | No abuse of discretion; court reasonably weighed factors and denial did not violate due process/equal protection or constitute cruel and unusual punishment |
| Whether Penal Code § 1001.36 (pretrial mental‑health diversion) applies retroactively to defendants whose cases have been adjudicated but are not yet final | § 1001.36 is prospective; it defines ‘‘pretrial diversion’’ and contains procedural prerequisites (waiver of speedy trial, hearings, reinstatement rules) that presuppose pre‑adjudication application | § 1001.36 is ameliorative and should apply retroactively to all nonfinal cases under In re Estrada and People v. Lara | § 1001.36 is not retroactive to post‑adjudication cases; statute’s text, structure, and legislative history demonstrate intent to limit application to pre‑adjudication (pretrial) proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Williams, 17 Cal.4th 148 (section 1385 framework for considering striking strikes)
- People v. Carmony, 33 Cal.4th 367 (abuse of discretion standard for refusing to strike prior conviction)
- In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (presumption that ameliorative criminal statutes apply retroactively unless Legislature indicates otherwise)
- People v. Lara, 4 Cal.5th 299 (application of Estrada to juvenile transfer reform and retroactivity analysis)
- People v. Buycks, 5 Cal.5th 857 (discussion of Estrada’s scope and legislative intent inquiry)
- People v. Frahs, 27 Cal.App.5th 784 (concluding § 1001.36 retroactive; cited and discussed)
- People v. Weaver, 36 Cal.App.5th 1103 (concluding § 1001.36 retroactive; contrasted in opinion)
- People v. Craine, 35 Cal.App.5th 744 (describing § 1001.36 as ameliorative)
- Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (right to speedy trial no longer exists after conviction; relevant to § 1001.36’s waiver requirement)