2020 CO 81
Colo.2020Background:
- Defendant Dearies Lee allegedly twice strangled his ex-girlfriend, causing her to lose consciousness.
- The People initially charged two counts of second-degree assault under the strangulation subsection, § 18-3-203(1)(i).
- Eight months later the People added two counts charging second-degree assault-bodily injury with a deadly weapon, § 18-3-203(1)(b), alleging Lee’s hands were a deadly weapon.
- The trial court dismissed the added deadly-weapon counts on Colorado equal protection grounds; the court of appeals affirmed.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether charging the same strangulation conduct under both subsections violates Colorado equal protection doctrine.
- The Court concluded the subsections proscribe identical conduct for strangulation, the deadly-weapon subsection carries a harsher penalty, and charging under both therefore violates Colorado equal protection; prosecutions for strangulation must be charged under the strangulation subsection.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant may be prosecuted for the same strangulation conduct under both § 18-3-203(1)(b) (deadly weapon) and § 18-3-203(1)(i) (strangulation) | The People argued distinctions exist (e.g., degree of pressure, duration, or injury) and prosecutorial charging discretion allows choosing the harsher statute | Lee argued Colorado equal protection forbids charging identical conduct under two statutes that carry different maximum penalties; strangulation should be charged under § 18-3-203(1)(i) | Court held the two subsections proscribe identical conduct when the act is strangulation (hands or other instrument used as a weapon capable of causing death/serious injury), the deadly-weapon subsection punishes more harshly, and charging under both violates Colorado equal protection; must charge under the strangulation subsection |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (federal rule permitting prosecution under either of overlapping statutes unless discriminatory enforcement shown)
- People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981) (equal protection violated where different statutes proscribe the same conduct with disparate penalties)
- People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002) (two-step inquiry whether an instrument is a deadly weapon: used/intended as a weapon and capable of producing serious bodily injury)
- Dean v. People, 366 P.3d 593 (Colo. 2016) (Colorado equal protection principle that identical proscribed conduct may not receive disparate statutory punishment)
- People v. Griego, 409 P.3d 338 (Colo. 2018) (discussing intelligible distinctions required to avoid equal protection problems)
- People v. Saleh, 45 P.3d 1272 (Colo. 2002) (hands and feet can be deadly weapons depending on manner of use)
- People v. Ross, 831 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1992) (fists may be deadly weapons if used in manner capable of producing death or serious bodily injury)
- Campbell v. People, 73 P.3d 11 (Colo. 2003) (statutory distinctions can survive equal protection review where elements permit intelligible differentiation)