39 Cal.App.5th 557
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- On Feb. 25, 2014, defendant's Nissan and a Mitsubishi were observed revving and driving aggressively; witnesses reported what looked like drag-racing and very high speeds before a broadside collision killed the driver of a Cadillac.
- Collision investigators estimated the Nissan's impact speed ranged from about 65 mph (defense expert) to a minimum of 105 mph (prosecution expert using colinear momentum); the Cadillac was at or near a stop according to the prosecution expert.
- Defendant was charged with vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence (Pen. Code § 192(c)(1)); a lesser included offense was vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence (§ 192(c)(2)).
- The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 592 (gross negligence) and 593 (ordinary negligence) but also used CALCRIM Nos. 253 and 3404 which referred to “criminal negligence” without defining it and treated that term as encompassing both gross and ordinary negligence.
- Defendant argued the use of the undefined term "criminal negligence" (generally equivalent to gross negligence) in the catch-all instructions created confusing/conflicting instructions and prejudiced his conviction; the jury convicted and sentenced him to two years.
- The Court of Appeal acknowledged the trial court should have used consistent terminology and defined the term, but held any instructional error was harmless given the instructions as a whole and counsel’s closing arguments distinguishing ordinary and gross negligence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether using the term "criminal negligence" in CALCRIM 253 and 3404 without defining it was reversible instructional error | The prosecution argued the instructions as a whole (including CALCRIM 592 and 593) correctly conveyed the required mental states | Kumar argued "criminal negligence" was used inconsistently and not defined, risking jury confusion that could lower the standard for convicting of gross negligence | Court held it was error to use "criminal negligence" without defining it but the error was harmless — instructions and counsel adequately conveyed distinction between gross and ordinary negligence |
| Whether the instruction error amounted to constitutional error (relieved prosecution's burden or confused mental state) | Prosecution: no constitutional problem because jury was properly instructed overall and counsel emphasized differences | Kumar: constitutional error because jury might have applied a lower negligence standard to the felony charge | Court held no constitutional error — reasonable jurors would have understood gross negligence was required for the felony conviction given instructions and arguments |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Ramos, 163 Cal.App.4th 1082 (discussing standard of review for jury instructions)
- In re Dennis B., 18 Cal.3d 687 (distinguishing ordinary negligence from criminal/gross negligence)
- People v. Penny, 44 Cal.2d 861 (treating criminal negligence/gross negligence as equivalent)
- People v. Nicolas, 8 Cal.App.5th 1165 (noting trial court error in using "criminal negligence" without definition)
- People v. Moye, 47 Cal.4th 537 (applying harmless-error analysis to instructional error)
- Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (jurors are presumed able to understand and reconcile instructions in context)