People v. Kerley
233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 135
| Cal. Ct. App. 5th | 2018Background
- Victim Danna Dever disappeared June 1996; her skeletal remains ("Jane Doe No. 7") were found July 1996 and later identified by fingerprint as Dever. Kerley was indicted for murder in 2011 and convicted of second‑degree murder in 2013; sentence 15 years to life.
- Long history of admitted/proffered domestic violence: numerous family, neighbor, and police witnesses described repeated beatings, threats, and isolation of Dever by defendant Lonnie Kerley over many years; Kerley had pending domestic‑violence charges at the time Dever disappeared.
- Forensic evidence was mixed: one forensic anthropologist (Dr. Murad) opined perimortem rib fractures and hyoid damage consistent with homicide by beating; other experts (including defense experts) concluded manner and cause were undetermined and some damage could be postmortem or from autopsy.
- Investigative and circumstantial evidence: Dever’s body was found nude and partially wrapped in a blanket in a remote ditch; Kerley delayed reporting her missing; physical items were found buried in Kerley’s yard (later explained as his dog in a suitcase); a pubic hair in Kerley’s earlier car matched Dever’s mtDNA profile; Kerley dismantled a tanning bed after police inquiries.
- At trial the prosecution admitted extensive prior domestic‑violence evidence (Evidence Code §§ 1101(b), 1109) and multiple out‑of‑court statements by Dever; defense challenged sufficiency of homicide proof, evidentiary rulings, Confrontation Clause, and third‑party culpability claims.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Kerley’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Dever’s death was homicide | Circumstantial facts (body disposal, prior abuse, mtDNA hair, timing) and Dr. Murad’s opinion suffice | Medical testimony conflicted; no direct proof of assaultive death | Affirmed — viewed in light most favorable to People, circumstantial evidence plus Dr. Murad was sufficient (Jackson standard; Towler instructive) |
| Admissibility of prior domestic‑violence acts (Evid. Code §1109 / §1101(b)) | Prior abuse shows motive, intent, common scheme and propensity in domestic‑violence murder charge; probative value exceeds prejudice | Evidence was remote, inflammatory, and more prejudicial than probative under §352 | Affirmed — §1109 applies (defendant accused of domestic‑violence offense); court properly weighed §352 and excluded a few incidents but admitted relevant pattern evidence |
| Jury instruction re: standard for proving uncharged acts (CALCRIM 852 partial) | Instruction properly required preponderance to find prior acts then reasonable doubt still governed guilt | Omitted language allowed jurors to use preponderance to convict on murder | Affirmed — instruction did not lower burden on guilt; reasonable‑doubt instructions remained controlling (Loy/Reliford analysis) |
| Admissibility of Dever’s out‑of‑court statements (Confrontation Clause/Crawford) | Many statements were nontestimonial (during ongoing emergencies); testimonial ones were admissible because defendant forfeited confrontation by wrongdoing (§1390/Giles) | Testimonial statements (police interviews) violated Crawford; trial court erred to admit them | Affirmed — emergency statements were nontestimonial; other testimonial statements were admissible under forfeiture by wrongdoing with independent corroboration (court found sufficient corroboration) |
| Motion for mistrial over admission of sexual‑history detail | Admission was opened or spontaneous; admissible to explain events and state of mind | Detail was testimonial and prejudicial; required mistrial | Denied — court found either opened door or forfeiture; any error harmless in context |
| Admission of other evidence (diaries, suitcase/dog burial, tanning‑bed disposal) | Diary entries admissible for impeachment; burial and tanning‑bed conduct probative of consciousness of guilt | Diary entries hearsay/irrelevant; suitcase/tanning bed irrelevant and unduly prejudicial | Affirmed — diarie s used for impeachment with limiting instructions; burial and disposal evidence had probative value and any prejudice did not outweigh it |
| Third‑party culpability evidence (Danny Lewis, Joe Naso) | Defense sought to present alternate suspects named in anonymous letter and Naso links | Exclusion denied as insufficiently linked to the crime | Affirmed — court did not abuse discretion; proffer failed to provide direct/circumstantial link to perpetration |
| Cumulative error claim | Errors, if any, were harmless; overall trial fair | Cumulative admission of multiple errors denied fair trial | Affirmed — isolated errors were harmless beyond reasonable doubt; no reversible cumulative error |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Towler, 31 Cal.3d 105 (habeas; body found remote; circumstantial proof of homicide upheld)
- People v. Loy, 52 Cal.4th 46 (jury instruction on uncharged‑acts standard and burden of proof)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause bars testimonial hearsay absent prior opportunity for cross‑examination)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (distinguishing testimonial vs. nontestimonial statements in domestic‑violence context)
- Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (objective test for primary purpose of statements; ongoing emergency analysis)
- Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (forfeiture by wrongdoing requires intent to prevent testimony)
- People v. Cage, 40 Cal.4th 965 (application of Crawford/Davis to hospital/interview contexts)
- People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th 903 (factors for §352 balancing of uncharged‑act evidence)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence)