People v. Jones, 2016 IL 119391

Derrick Jones was convicted of aggravated robbery (Class 1) and sentenced to an extended-term (24 years) based on a presentence report indicating a 2005 juvenile adjudication for multiple offenses including three counts of residential burglary.
At trial no evidence of the juvenile adjudication was presented to the jury; the PSI documented the juvenile dispositions and listed "Juvenile Probation" for the burglary counts.
Jones raised a sentencing challenge on direct appeal: he argued using the juvenile adjudication to impose an extended term violated Apprendi (and Illinois §111-3(c-5)) because it was not alleged in the indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; alternatively he argued the PSI was an unreliable source under Shepard.
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed; the Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and again affirmed the appellate court.
The majority held (1) a prior juvenile adjudication counts as a “prior conviction” for Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception and Illinois §111-3(c-5), and (2) the PSI here conclusively established the juvenile adjudication and did not violate Shepard.
A dissent argued that Illinois precedent treats "conviction" as excluding juvenile adjudications for statutory purposes, so the legislature’s wording in §111-3(c-5) requires pleading/proof beyond a reasonable doubt before using the adjudication to enhance a sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication is a “prior conviction” under Apprendi and §111-3(c-5) so it may be used to enhance sentence without being alleged/proved to a jury	State: juvenile adjudications are functionally equivalent to prior convictions for sentencing because juvenile proceedings afford constitutionally sufficient safeguards	Jones: juvenile adjudications are not "convictions" for statutory purposes; Apprendi/§111-3(c-5) require pleading/proof beyond a reasonable doubt	Majority: juvenile adjudications fall within Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception and §111-3(c-5) need not be triggered; no Apprendi error
Whether the PSI provided an adequate, permissible basis to establish the juvenile adjudication (Shepard issue)	State: a statutorily compiled PSI is a reliable criminal-history source and here unequivocally shows adjudication for residential burglary	Jones: PSI is ambiguous/tenuous and akin to documents disallowed by Shepard; cannot be sole basis for enhancement	Court: PSI here was statutorily sufficient, unambiguous, and unlike the police reports Shepard rejected; reliance did not violate Shepard

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (facts increasing statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, except prior convictions)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (U.S. 2005) (limits sentencing-court reliance to certain documents when determining prior convictions under ACCA)
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (U.S. 1998) (recognized prior-conviction exception to element/pleading requirement)
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (U.S. 1999) (distinguished factors that increase penalties and held some penalty provisions define separate elements)
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (U.S. 1971) (no constitutional right to jury trial in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings)
People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157 (Ill. 2006) (distinguished issue of juvenile adjudication as a statutory "conviction" from the Apprendi sentencing question)