People v. Johnson, 2022 IL App (5th) 180371-U

Kevin A. Johnson was convicted after a bench trial of three counts of criminal sexual assault and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse involving a minor family member; the court sentenced him to 34 years' imprisonment.
Investigators interviewed Johnson twice (Jan. 15 and Jan. 28, 2016). He signed Miranda waivers both times; the second interview followed a polygraph and Johnson was in jail on an unrelated matter.
Johnson claimed his Jan. 28 statements were involuntary because he was withdrawing from Oxycontin/Xanax, had just started Prozac, was in observation status, and had been threatened/promised inducements by Agent Colp and jail staff.
The trial court held a suppression hearing, credited Agent Colp’s testimony denying threats/promises and finding Johnson’s will not overborne, and denied the motion to suppress.
Posttrial, Johnson argued trial counsel was ineffective for not playing the videotaped interviews at the suppression hearing; the appellate court reviewed the recordings on appeal per Supreme Court Rule 329.
Victim impact testimony described significant psychological harm (self-harm, suicide attempts, ongoing treatment); the court considered that harm at sentencing over defendant’s objection and imposed consecutive terms within statutory ranges.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Were Johnson’s statements involuntary such that they should be suppressed?	State: statements were voluntary; Miranda waivers signed; interrogation techniques were permissible minimization, not coercion.	Johnson: withdrawing from drugs, on new medication, in observation, and subjected to threats/promises; will was overborne.	Denied. Court found statements voluntary based on totality of circumstances and witness credibility.
2. Was counsel ineffective for not admitting the videotaped interviews at the suppression hearing?	State: counsel’s failure did not prejudice Johnson because the tapes do not strengthen involuntariness claims.	Johnson: tapes would show his mental/physical state and coercion, so suppression hearing deprived court of crucial evidence.	Denied. Appellate review of the tapes showed no additional support for involuntariness; no reasonable probability of a different suppression result.
3. Did the court improperly rely on psychological harm (implicit in the offense) as an aggravating factor?	State: victim’s psychological harm is a proper aggravating factor supported by victim testimony and impact statements.	Johnson: considering mental harm double-counts an element implicit in the offense; plain error.	Denied. Record contained evidence of specific psychological harm; court permissibly considered it in sentencing.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda warnings and waiver principles)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard)
People v. Martin, 102 Ill. 2d 412 (Ill. 1984) (police deception and voluntariness—Miranda warnings and literacy weigh against involuntariness)
People v. Kashney, 111 Ill. 2d 454 (Ill. 1986) (police misrepresentations do not automatically render a confession involuntary)
People v. Valle, 405 Ill. App. 3d 46 (Ill. App. Ct.) (permitted minimization/de‑emphasis tactics do not necessarily overbear the will)
People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138 (Ill. 1995) (prejudice standard for suppression‑related ineffective assistance claims)
People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107 (Ill. 2004) (discussion of psychological harm from sexual offenses against children)