THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Aрpellee, v. ROLAND J. KASHNEY, Appellant. — THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DAVID LEE, Appellee.
Nos. 61310, 61342
Supreme Court of Illinois
Opinion filed February 21, 1986
Rehearing denied April 1, 1986
111 Ill. 2d 454
We conclude that Statesman did not become bound by its failure to respond within 30 days to the offer submitted by B&B through Associаtes. Accordingly, we need not consider the other arguments presented in this appeal, concerning the proper measure of damages for the alleged breach. For the reasons stated, the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed.
Judgments reversed.
James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Frank P. Madea, Assistant Public Defender, of сounsel), for appellant.
Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard M. Daley, State‘s Attorney, of Chicago
Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard M. Daley, State‘s Attorney, of Chicago (Mark L. Rotert, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicаgo, and Joan S. Cherry, Michael E. Shabat, Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., and Richard A. Stevens, Assistant State‘s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Steven Clark and Patricia Unsinn, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.
JUSTICE MORAN delivered the opinion of the court:
In cause No. 61310, defendant, Roland Kashney, was found guilty of the murder of Benjamin Peck by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 nor more than 60 years. Defendant appealed his conviction to the appellate court raising numerous errors at trial. Chief among these errors was a claim that the prosecution improperly used statements made by the defendant to court-appointed psychiatrists who examined him to determine his fitness for trial. The defendant argued that his statements werе inadmissible because he had not presented the affirmative defense of insanity. The court found no error and noted that the defendant “[had] not present[ed] a classic insanity defense in the sense of admitting the commission of the acts charged but contending that he was insane when he committed them. But he
In cause No. 61342, defendant, David Lee, was found guilty of rape by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County and was sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction. As he had not raised the affirmative defense of insаnity, defendant argued that the State should not have been permitted to introduce statements made during a court-ordered fitness examination for purposes of impeachment. The court agreed, reversing defendant‘s conviction and remanding the cause for a new trial. People v. Lee (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 774, 780.
Both appeals raise a common question arising under
“Statements made by the defendant and information gathered in the course of any examination or treatment ordered under
Section 104-13 ,104-17 or104-20 shall not be admissible against the defendant unless he raises the defense of insanity or the defense of drugged or intoxicated conditiоn, in which case they shall be admissible only on the issue of whether he was insane, drugged, or intoxicated. ***”Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 104-14(a) .
The defendant in cause No. 61342 raises a second is-
The facts are set out at length in the respective appellate court opinions. Therefore, the fаcts related herein are limited to those necessary to decide the issues raised in these appeals.
In cause No. 61310 defendant Kashney was arrested, on the basis of an informant‘s tip, for the murder and armed robbery of Margaret Riggins and the murder and armed robbery of Benjamin Peck. Shortly after his arrest and after being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant signed a written statement confessing to both murders.
Prior to trial defеndant moved to suppress his confession as given involuntarily, claiming that he had been hit on the head by an officer during questioning and that he was “afraid for his life.” The trial court held a hearing on defendant‘s motion. The court expressed concern about defendant‘s allegation of being hit but found no corroboration of the incident. Further, the court cited unrefuted testimony by the assistant State‘s Attorney that he had spoken privately with the defendant prior to taking his written statement. The assistant State‘s Attorney directly asked the defendant whether or not he had been threatened or abused in any way. The defendant answered in the negative. The court ruled that defendant‘s confession was voluntary. At trial, defendant‘s confession constituted the principal evidence against him.
After the suppression hearing, at the requеst of defense counsel, the trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant. On the basis of the psychiatric report, the court entered an order in August 1977 finding the defendant unfit to stand trial and remanding
Defendant testified at trial in his own behalf and denied having murdered or robbed anyone. On both direct examination and cross-examination, he was asked to explain why he would confess to crimes he claimed not to have committed. He answered that he was coerced into confessing by demons which possessed one of the investigating officers at the time of his post-arrest questioning. Throughout trial, the defendant asserted his innocence at the time of the acts and repeatedly explained his confession by reference to the asserted demonic possession of one of the officers. In support of this explanation, the defense called two psychiatrists, both of whom had participatеd in defendant‘s court-ordered fitness examinations. Both psychiatrists testified that defendant was mentally ill between 1977, when he was remanded to the Department of Mental Health, and February 1980, just prior to his last fitness examination. No opinions were given as to the defendant‘s sanity or insanity at the time of the alleged offenses.
The defense also called two expert witnesses in demonology. One of the witnessеs testified as to the possible existence of demons. The second expert testified that it was possible for a person to believe that another person is possessed by demons and, under such a belief, to respond with extreme fear.
The record indicates that while defense counsel steadfastly argued his client‘s position, he did not raise the defense of insanity during pretrial discovery or in pretrial motions. No instruction regarding defendant‘s insanity at the time of the acts charged was requested by
The defendant argues that
Whether or not the defendant raised the affirmative defense of insanity is not the dispositive issue in this case. The dispositive issue is whether or not the defendant can claim any protection under
For these reasons we affirm the judgment of the appellate court in cause No. 61310.
In cause No. 61342 defendant Lee was arrested and charged with rape alleged to have occurred on November 14, 1981. During questioning, the defendant was told
During the pretrial phase of the proceedings, defendant filed his answеr to the State‘s request for discovery. Therein, the “[d]efendant state[d] that he did not commit the crime as charged and will rely on the State‘s inability to prove same beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the defendant may rely on the affirmative defense of insanity. (Post stress syndrome.)” The trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant with regard to his fitness to stand trial and his sanity at the time оf the alleged offense. In June 1982, the psychiatric report was filed with the court which stated that the defendant was fit to stand trial and was sane at the time of the alleged offense.
The complainant testified for the State in its case in chief. She denied inviting the defendant to her apartment on November 14. She denied consenting to sexual intercourse with the defendant. She described the alleged rape and identified the defendant as her assailant. She also testified that her assailant was armed with what appeared to be a chrome-colored blade which he put to her throat.
The defendant called Dr. DeVito, his personal psychiatrist, who testified that the defendant suffered from a disorder known as post-traumatic stress syndrome. Dr. DeVito, after describing the disorder, testified that it is characterized by flashbacks to prior stressful experiences. He also testified that these flashbacks are trig-
The defendant then took the stand. He testified that he and the complainant had engaged in frequent consensual intercourse prior to the date of the alleged rape. He testified that he had telephoned the complainant on the night in question, asked to visit her, and that she agreed to see him. He testified that, after he arrived, he and the complainant went into her bedroom, undressed, and began to engage in consensual intercourse. Defendant testified that, during intercourse, he experienced a flashback to a brothel in Okinawa which he frequented during his military service, always seeing the same woman. The defendant continued, stating that, as a result of this flashback, the complainant became the woman from the brothel. He then began cursing the complainant and calling her names as he had done on one occasion to the woman from the brothel.
In rebuttal, over objection, the State called Dr. Grossman, the psychologist who had interviewed the defendant during his court-ordered fitness examination. The prosecutor elicited from Dr. Grossman statements made by the defendant during the interview. Dr. Grossman testified that defendant stated he was angry with the complainant; that “he thought he wanted to beat her up“; that “he had an ink pen and he thought that that would be a good weapon because no one could trace a pen.” The witness further testified that defendant said he had heard a voice telling him to ““[g]et her, kill her, choke her, beat her.“”
The defendant argues that
The State counters by arguing that the defendant raised the affirmative defense of insanity by introducing expert testimony that he suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome. Therefore, the State asserts the right, under the statute, to impeach defendant‘s psychiatric testimony through use of his prior inconsistent statements made during the course of the court-ordered fitness examination. We disagree.
The record in this case indicates that the defendant did not, during trial, raise the affirmativе defense of insanity at the time of the act. He took the stand, denied raping the complainant, and claimed that the complainant had consented to intercourse. The defendant called his personal psychiatrist to explain why he might verbally abuse the complainant during what he claimed was consensual intercourse and why, as a result, the complainant might accuse him of rape. Moreover, on cross-examination of the defendant‘s expert, the State established that the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the offense charged.
It is undisputed that the defendant made the contested statements during a court-ordered fitness examination. Because we find that the defendant did not raise the affirmative defense of insanity, the State was barred by the exclusionary lаnguage of
The defendant raises a second issue. He argues that any incriminating statements given during his initial questioning were involuntary because they were elicited as a result of a deliberate misrepresentation by the assistant State‘s Attorney. The claimed misrepresentation сoncerned a statement by the State‘s Attorney that the defendant‘s fingerprints “were found all over the apartment.” Prior to this comment, the defendant had denied being in the complainant‘s apartment and, to that point, had not given any inculpatory statements. After the comment, the defendant admitted being in the apartment and then proceeded to give his account of the events on the night in questiоn.
This court‘s recent decision in People v. Martin (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 412, cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 935, 83 L. Ed. 2d 270, 105 S. Ct. 334, is dispositive on this issue. There, both the police and thе State‘s Attorney knowingly and falsely told the defendant that his co-defendant had named him as the “triggerman” in a homicide. The defendant then made incriminating statements. This court found, under the totality of the circumstances, that defendant‘s incriminating statements were given freely, voluntarily, and without any coercion overbearing his will despite the deliberate and false misrepresentation. 102 Ill. 2d 412, 427.
Martin holds that inculpatory statements which are voluntary are not necessarily vitiated by misrepresentations by authorities. A misrepresentation which prompts inculpatory statements is only one factor to be considered in determining the voluntariness of the resulting statements. Other factors must be considered as well, such as, the “age, education and intelligence of the accused, the duration of questioning, and whether he re-
In cause No. 61342, although we disagree with that portion of the appellate court‘s opinion which found defendant‘s inculpatory statements to the assistant State‘s Attorney involuntary and inadmissible, we nevertheless affirm the appellate court‘s judgment reversing defendant‘s conviction on the grounds that the State improperly introduced certain statements made by defendant which are subject to a statutory exclusion. The cause is remanded to the circuit court of Cook County for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
61310 — Judgment affirmed.
61342 — Affirmed and remanded, with directions.
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion in People v. Martin (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 412, I disagree with that portion of the majority opinion which аpproves the deceptive practice employed in obtaining defendant Lee‘s incriminating statement. To so hold violates the pronouncement in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 476, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629:
“[A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver [of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination] will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.”
JUSTICE SIMON joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.