People v. Johnson
241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 782
| Cal. | 2018Background
- Defendant Cedric Johnson was convicted by a Los Angeles jury of two first‑degree murders with multiple‑murder special circumstance and firearm enhancements and sentenced to death; appeal is automatic.
- Throughout pretrial and trial proceedings Johnson repeatedly disrupted court, spat on and threatened his lawyer Steven Hauser, and at a retrial physically attacked Hauser in the jury assembly room while wearing a stun belt.
- After the attack and repeated disruptive conduct, the trial court excluded Johnson from the courtroom for the remainder of the retrial, provided an audio feed/transcripts, and allowed counsel to proceed in his absence.
- The court attempted to permit Johnson to testify remotely under strict question‑and‑answer ground rules; a bench "dry run" showed he refused to comply, and the court terminated the attempt, finding he forfeited the right to testify.
- Johnson raised multiple claims on appeal related to exclusion from the courtroom, waiver/forfeiture of the right to testify, denial of Marsden motions/new counsel, failure to order competency proceedings, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and constitutional challenges to California’s capital scheme.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Johnson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion from courtroom for disruptive conduct | Court may exclude a defendant who by misconduct forfeits presence; exclusion was necessary for safety and orderly trial | Exclusion at hearing where he was absent violated his right to be present and required warnings/evidentiary hearing | Exclusion upheld: misconduct (violent assault on counsel, repeated disruptions) forfeited right to be present; no prior warning or full hearing required under circumstances (Allen). |
| Right to testify (guilt/penalty phases) | Forfeiture was proper after defendant refused Q&A rules during remote testimony dry run; court warned him | Court improperly terminated testimony and effectively coerced waiver; jury should have heard him | Upheld: repeated warnings, opportunity, and demonstrable refusal justified forfeiture of right to testify. |
| Marsden/new counsel (post‑mistrial requests) | No showing of inadequate performance or irreconcilable conflict; many requests were not proper Marsden motions | Denial of new counsel after mistrial was error; some requests were ignored | Denial not reversible: record shows defendant did not make adequate Marsden motions on cited dates; some complaints were gamesmanship or caused by defendant’s own conduct. |
| Competency inquiry (sua sponte) | No substantial evidence of incompetence requiring §1368 hearing; disruptive behavior attributable to strategic gamesmanship | Court should have suspended proceedings and held competency hearing given psychosis evidence | No abuse of discretion: absence of expert or counsel concern, defendant previously assisted and testified, and record supported malingering/strategy rather than incapacity. |
| Conflict of interest (counsel) | Counsel’s continued representation not an actual disabling conflict; tactical choices plausible | Attack and prosecution’s use of assault placed counsel in conflict, impairing defense | No actual conflict shown and no adverse effect demonstrated; court properly inquired and credited counsel’s ability to continue. |
| Evidentiary rulings (Huggins, Rochelle, Newton) | Stray or rehabilitative evidence and prior inconsistent statements handled properly; curative instructions sufficient | Some hearsay and impeachment exclusions prejudiced defense (e.g., Rochelle’s out‑of‑court remark, Newton’s expectation of benefit) | No reversible error: Rochelle’s remark admissible as prior inconsistent statement; Huggins’s volunteered comment cured by striking/admonition; Newton’s impeachment/favor evidence either elicited or forfeited. |
| Jury instructions (oral‑statement caution, absence wording, reasonable‑doubt) | Any omission was harmless; trial included robust credibility and reasonable‑doubt instructions | Failure to give cautionary instruction for defendant’s oral admissions and use of "voluntarily" concerning absence prejudiced defendant | Error in omitting cautionary instruction conceded but harmless given other credibility instructions; use of "voluntarily" not reasonably likely to harm given repeated admonitions to the jury. |
| Cumulative error and death‑penalty challenges | No reversible error; California capital scheme constitutional as applied | Cumulative trial failings and statutory defects require reversal or constitutional relief | Rejected: no prejudicial cumulative error; death‑penalty challenges long‑rejected by court. |
Key Cases Cited
- Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (defendant may lose right to be present by disruptive conduct)
- Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (right to presence at critical stages unless valid waiver or forfeiture)
- People v. Banks, 59 Cal.4th 1113 (2014) (upholding exclusion in aggravated misconduct contexts)
- People v. Diaz, 60 Cal.4th 1176 (2015) (cautionary instruction for oral admissions required only on request)
- People v. Medina, 11 Cal.4th 694 (1995) (defendant forfeits right to be present by disruptive behavior)
- People v. Beagle, 6 Cal.3d 441 (1972) (sua sponte duty to instruct re: oral admissions historically recognized)
- People v. Jackson, 13 Cal.4th 1164 (1996) (limits on defendant absence and waiver of presence)