32 Cal.App.5th 938
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- In 2009 Willie Mervyn Johnson was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and a true finding that he used a firearm; the trial court sentenced him to 15-years-to-life plus a consecutive 10-year firearm enhancement under Penal Code § 12022.53(b).
- Johnson’s direct appeal was affirmed and the California Supreme Court denied review; his certiorari period to the U.S. Supreme Court expired on September 13, 2011, making the judgment final for many retroactivity purposes.
- He pursued multiple postconviction and collateral actions (state and federal habeas, restitution motions) but did not obtain collateral relief that would reopen his judgment.
- On April 9, 2018 Johnson moved in superior court to stay or strike the firearm enhancement under Senate Bill No. 620 (amending § 12022.53(h)), but the trial court summarily denied the motion.
- The Court of Appeal held the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief under SB 620 because subdivision (h) does not apply to final judgments unless the defendant obtained collateral relief that produced a nonfinal judgment or resentencing eligibility.
- The appeal was dismissed as irregular and not appealable from an order made after judgment affecting substantial rights (§ 1237(b)); the summary denial was appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 12022.53(h) (SB 620) permits resentencing for a defendant whose judgment was final before the amendment | SB 620 does not apply to final judgments absent collateral relief; the court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief | Johnson argued he was eligible for relief and entitled to a hearing, counsel, and other sentencing protections | Held: § 12022.53(h) does not apply to Johnson’s final judgment because he did not obtain collateral relief; trial court correctly denied relief and appeal dismissed |
| Whether collateral habeas petitions toll or extend finality for SB 620 eligibility | Plaintiff: finality is determined by exhaustion of direct review (including certiorari period); collateral petitions do not render judgment nonfinal for § 12022.53(h) purposes | Defendant: his later habeas/motions maintain entitlement to resentencing under SB 620 | Held: Only defendants who obtained collateral relief (habeas) to reopen a judgment are covered; mere filing of petitions does not qualify |
| Whether defendant is entitled to presence, counsel, de novo resentencing, evidence, confrontation absent an order to show cause | Plaintiff: these rights attach only to original sentencing or after court issues order to show cause; no entitlement before that | Defendant: Johnson claimed entitlement to full resentencing rights immediately | Held: Those rights do not attach absent an order in the nature of an order to show cause; summary denial appropriate |
| Appealability of the trial court’s summary denial | Plaintiff: order is not an appealable postjudgment order affecting substantial rights; appeal is irregular | Defendant: appeals the denial of SB 620 relief | Held: Appeal dismissed as not appealable under § 1237(b) and subject to dismissal under § 1248 |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Romero, 8 Cal.4th 728 (1994) (summary denial procedure and limits on postjudgment relief)
- In re Harris, 5 Cal.4th 813 (1993) (State interest in finality of criminal judgments)
- People v. Arredondo, 21 Cal.App.5th 493 (2018) (SB 620’s discretionary striking applies to nonfinal judgments and to defendants who obtained collateral relief)
- People v. Billingsley, 22 Cal.App.5th 1076 (2018) (interpreting SB 620 to permit trial court discretion in limited circumstances)
- People v. Woods, 19 Cal.App.5th 1080 (2018) (SB 620 applies to certain nonfinal judgments)
- People v. Vieira, 35 Cal.4th 264 (2005) (a judgment is not final for retroactivity purposes until the certiorari period to the U.S. Supreme Court expires)