32 Cal.App.5th 26
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- In May 2014 Lamar Canady was shot to death in his San Diego barbershop; surveillance, phone data, and witness evidence led to arrests of Peter Johnson and Ian Guthrie as participants in a conspiracy led by Omar Grant.
- Johnson was identified on video, had DNA/fingerprints on beer cans, possessed clothing from the scene when arrested, and confessed to being the shooter; his jury found him guilty of first degree murder and a personal firearm-use enhancement.
- Guthrie was tied by cell records, surveillance, contacts with Johnson and association with Grant; his jury convicted him of first degree murder as an aider/abettor.
- Trial evidence included cell‑phone records, surveillance video, fraudulent identification documents, and a rap song recorded by the victim (admitted as evidence of motive).
- Both defendants appealed on multiple grounds (Miranda waiver/invocation, insufficiency of evidence, admission of immigration-related forgeries, failure to instruct lesser offenses, admission of victim’s rap lyrics, and discovery re: cell‑site simulator). The court affirmed convictions but remanded limitedly for resentencing under new statutes granting courts discretion to strike certain enhancements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to instruct lesser included offenses (Johnson) | No instruction required because evidence supported premeditated first‑degree murder only. | Second‑degree murder or manslaughter instructions were warranted by possible drug‑deal‑gone‑bad or heat‑of‑passion theories. | Affirmed: no substantial evidence supported lesser offense instructions. |
| Admissibility of fraudulent ID documents and immigration evidence (Johnson & Guthrie) | Documents were probative of a common fraudster and conspiracy; limiting questions avoided immigration prejudice. | Evidence was highly prejudicial and inflammatory (immigration status). | Affirmed: probative value of common features outweighed prejudice; trial court limited immigration testimony. |
| Use of Johnson’s Jamaican murder conviction as a strike prior (Johnson) | Foreign murder conviction includes same elements as California murder; admissible under §668 and related case law. | Jamaican conviction procedures (e.g., 11‑person/9‑juror verdicts) differ from California and violate equal protection. | Affirmed: equal protection claim rejected; foreign conviction may be used so long as elements align and guilt‑ascertainment is not constitutionally flawed. |
| Miranda invocation and suppression (Guthrie) | Waived rights initially; later ambiguous references to a lawyer did not unambiguously invoke counsel. | Guthrie unequivocally requested a lawyer during custodial interrogation; post‑invocation statements should be suppressed. | Affirmed: officers reasonably treated statements as ambiguous; interrogation properly continued after clarification. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for aiding/abetting (Guthrie) | Cell records, video, and other circumstantial evidence established presence, communications, and conduct supporting aiding/abetting or conspiracy. | Evidence was only circumstantial and insufficient to prove Guthrie was at scene or a participant. | Affirmed: substantial evidence (phone calls, timing, surveillance, conduct) supported jury verdict. |
| Admission of victim’s rap lyrics (Guthrie) | Lyrics were relevant to motive/identity and admissible; ambiguity goes to weight. | Lyrics are creative, ambiguous, and prejudicial; inadmissible hearsay. | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion admitting lyrics as relevant to motive; probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice. |
| Continuance/discovery re: cell‑site simulator (Guthrie) | Requested continuance to investigate possible warrantless/overbroad use of simulator and content interception. | Warrants authorized location tracking/GPS; in‑camera review showed no content interception and use was within warrants. | Affirmed: court conducted in camera review, found no evidence of content surveillance, and denial of continuance was not an abuse of discretion. |
| Retroactive application of resentencing statutes (Johnson & Guthrie) | Newly enacted statutes (SB 620, SB 1393) grant discretion to strike enhancements and apply retroactively; remand unnecessary if record shows court would not have struck. | People concede retroactivity but argue remand is futile because judge would not have struck enhancements. | Remand limited for resentencing: court lacked discretion at original sentencing; remand ordered to allow consideration of striking enhancements. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings and waiver requirement)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (clarifies that invocations of right to counsel must be unambiguous)
- People v. Andrews, 49 Cal.3d 200 (1989) (foreign convictions may be used for sentencing if guilt‑ascertainment not constitutionally flawed)
- People v. Breverman, 19 Cal.4th 142 (1998) (duty to instruct on lesser included offenses when substantial evidence supports them)
- People v. Francis, 71 Cal.2d 66 (1969) (retroactivity principle for ameliorative sentencing changes)
- People v. Beltran, 56 Cal.4th 935 (2013) (distinctions among homicide degrees and heat‑of‑passion manslaughter)