People v. Johnson
62 Cal. 4th 600
| Cal. | 2016Background
- Defendant Billy Joe Johnson, a documented White supremacist gang member (PENI), was convicted of first-degree murder for the 2002 killing of Scott Miller; jury found lying-in-wait and gang special‑circumstance allegations true and returned a death verdict.
- Prosecution theory: defendant lured Miller from a party on a pretext (buying drugs) and aided-and-abetted PENI members (Lamb and Rump) who executed Miller in an alley; physical and testimonial evidence (autopsy, casing, tire impressions, witnesses, defendant’s post-shooting statements) supported that account.
- After guilt phase, the court found true a prior‑murder special‑circumstance based on defendant’s 2004 conviction for killing Cory Lamons; that murder (and other violent history, prison violence, recorded jail calls) was presented at penalty phase as aggravating evidence.
- Defense mitigation emphasized defendant’s social history, psychological profile (antisocial personality disorder; high psychopathy checklist score), family ties, and defendant’s stated preference for death row over long SHU confinement.
- The trial court instructed on aider/abettor liability using a then-current CALCRIM instruction that stated principals are “equally guilty”; prosecutor elicited victim‑impact testimony from the mother of Lamons (a noncapital victim) and addressed jurors individually during penalty closing argument.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to support lying‑in‑wait special circumstance and first‑degree murder | Prosecution: evidence showed concealment of purpose, a substantial period of watching/waiting, and a surprise attack from a position of advantage; defendant aided and abetted with intent to kill. | Johnson: Miller knew he was targeted and on guard; no concealment of purpose or surprise—thus insufficient evidence for lying‑in‑wait. | Court: Evidence was sufficient; rational jury could find aiding/abetting with intent and all elements of lying‑in‑wait satisfied. |
| Constitutionality (facial and as‑applied) of amended lying‑in‑wait special circumstance (Prop.18 change to "by means of") | State: Amendment aligned special circumstance with 1st‑degree lying‑in‑wait murder but still narrows class of death‑eligible offenders and is not unconstitutionally vague. | Johnson: Amendment made the special circumstance indistinguishable from ordinary murder theory, risking arbitrary death‑eligibility under Eighth Amendment. | Court: Rejected challenge; amendment lawful and special circumstance still distinguishes a culpable subclass and is not unconstitutionally vague either facially or as‑applied here. |
| Jury instruction (CALCRIM former No. 400: "equally guilty") and burden on aider/abettor liability | Prosecution: instruction correctly stated general rule that principals are criminally liable; accompanied by CALCRIM No. 401 which defined aider/abettor mental state. | Johnson: "Equally guilty" could mislead jurors to base his guilt on the perpetrator’s mental state rather than his own, violating due process. | Court: No reversible error — instruction stated correct general law, accompanied by precise aider/abettor instructions, and record showed defendant shared murderous intent. |
| Admission of victim‑impact testimony about noncapital murder (Lamons) at penalty | Prosecution: factor (b) permits evidence of other violent criminal activity, including the nature/circumstances and impact on victims; Payne permits victim‑impact evidence to assess blameworthiness. | Johnson: Testimony about Lamons’ mother’s grief was irrelevant to penalty for Miller’s murder and unduly prejudicial. | Court: Overruled contrary precedent; admitted such victim‑impact evidence under factor (b) is permissible (subject to limits); admission here lawful and not constitutionally barred. |
| Prosecutor addressing jurors individually in penalty closing (misconduct / ineffective assistance) | Johnson: Individualized appeals to jurors inflamed passions and violated due process; failure to object was ineffective assistance. | State: Defense counsel failed to object (forfeiture); tactical reasons may explain omission; claim better raised via habeas. | Court: Claim forfeited for lack of timely objection; effectiveness claim not resolved on direct appeal—better suited for habeas because record lacks counsel’s reasons. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Moon, 37 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2005) (definition and elements of lying‑in‑wait special‑circumstance)
- People v. Bonilla, 41 Cal.4th 313 (Cal. 2007) (aider/abettor liability where defendant lured victim to a location for confederates to kill; characterization as classic lying‑in‑wait)
- People v. Morales, 48 Cal.3d 527 (Cal. 1989) (lying‑in‑wait elements: concealment of purpose, watching/waiting, surprise attack)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (U.S. 1994) (Eighth Amendment limits on death‑eligibility: aggravating circumstance must narrow class and not be unconstitutionally vague)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (U.S. 1991) (Eighth Amendment permits victim‑impact evidence at penalty phase)
- People v. Edwards, 54 Cal.3d 787 (Cal. 1991) (recognizing victim‑impact evidence for capital crimes and reasoning about factor (a))
- People v. McCoy, 25 Cal.4th 1111 (Cal. 2001) (aider/abettor mens rea may be more or less culpable than perpetrator; liability ‘floats free’)
- People v. Catlin, 26 Cal.4th 81 (Cal. 2001) (upholding murder‑by‑poison special circumstance against Eighth Amendment vagueness attack)