People v. Johnson
61 Cal. 4th 734
Cal.2015Background
- Lumord Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder (Campos) and second-degree murder (Camerina "Candy" Lopez); jury found multiple-murder and robbery- and kidnap-murder special circumstances as to Campos; prior manslaughter conviction proven. Trial court later sentenced Johnson to death on both counts (automatic appeal).
- Lopez was shot after stepping between Johnson and her boyfriend; dying declarations and eyewitnesses identified Johnson and a shotgun recovered in a backyard linked to the wound.
- Campos was ambushed during a purported drug transaction at Oscar Ross’s property; witnesses placed Johnson at the scene and Ross and Brightmon implicated Johnson in the killing and disposition of Campos’s body.
- Significant penalty-phase aggravating evidence included prior violent acts (1983 manslaughter of Estrada, 1989 shooting of Hider, other violent incidents), threatening phone calls while incarcerated, and misconduct in custody; mitigating evidence included childhood abuse, instability, and institutional hardship.
- Key procedural disputes on appeal: denial of severance of the two murders, Batson/Wheeler claims about peremptory strikes against African-American jurors, admissibility of Lopez’s dying declarations (Confrontation Clause), an erroneous kidnapping instruction (pre- vs post-1999 law), and an erroneous verdict form sentencing Johnson to death for a second-degree murder.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of severance of Lopez and Campos charges | Joinder proper under §954; efficiency and evidence supported joint trial | Joinder prejudiced Johnson because evidence not cross-admissible and risk of spillover from one homicide to the other | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; factors (cross-admissibility, inflammatory risk, weak/strong spillover, capitalization) did not mandate severance |
| Batson/Wheeler challenge to peremptory strikes of Black jurors | Prosecution offered race-neutral reasons (views on death penalty, deadlocked jury service) | Johnson argued strikes were pretextual and disparate treatment of similarly situated white jurors | Affirmed: trial court credited prosecutors’ neutral reasons; substantial-evidence standard supports no discriminatory intent |
| Admissibility of Lopez’s statements as dying declarations (Confrontation Clause/due process) | Dying declarations historically admissible; statements met Evid. Code §1242 (personal knowledge, sense of impending death) | Johnson argued statements were testimonial, exceeded identification, and deprived confrontation/right to reliability | Affirmed: dying-declaration exception applies; Monterroso/D’Arcy precedent supports admissibility; reliability and statutory elements satisfied |
| Kidnap-murder special-circumstance instructional error (simple kidnapping definition) | Prosecution: jury was instructed on aggravated-kidnap theory and robbery-murder true; special circumstance stands at least on correct theory | Johnson: jury received 1999 Martinez definition of simple kidnapping (broader) though crimes occurred pre-Martinez (Caudillo standard), so verdict may rest on erroneous theory | Reversed as to kidnap-murder special circumstance: instruction on simple kidnapping was incorrect for crimes committed in 1995 and jury form did not specify theory, so cannot determine basis—set aside |
| Death sentence for Lopez (second-degree murder) due to erroneous verdict form | State argued jury understood death eligibility from Campos special circumstances and overall record made jury intent clear | Johnson argued death is unauthorized for second-degree murder and verdict form could have biased penalty decision | Death sentence vacated for Lopez (not authorized); remainder of penalty judgment affirmed as error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for Campos death sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (testimonial statements and confrontation-clause framework)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (U.S. 2003) (assessment of plausibility of race-neutral justifications for peremptory strikes)
- Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (U.S. 2005) (Batson framework and burden shifting)
- People v. Monterroso, 34 Cal.4th 743 (Cal. 2004) (dying-declaration exception consistent with confrontation clause)
- People v. D'Arcy, 48 Cal.4th 257 (Cal. 2010) (affirming Monterroso on dying declarations)
- People v. Martinez, 20 Cal.4th 225 (Cal. 1999) (broadened kidnapping-asportation instruction—totality of circumstances)
- People v. Caudillo, 21 Cal.3d 562 (Cal. 1978) (pre-Martinez rule focusing on actual distance moved for simple kidnapping)
- People v. Morgan, 42 Cal.4th 593 (Cal. 2007) (reversing kidnap-murder special-circumstance when erroneous Martinez instruction given for pre-Martinez crime)
- People v. Kraft, 23 Cal.4th 978 (Cal. 2000) (joinder/severance standards under §954)
- People v. Lenix, 44 Cal.4th 602 (Cal. 2008) (deferential review of third-stage Batson inquiry)