People v. Johnson, 61 Cal. 4th 674

In 2012 California voters passed Proposition 36 (Three Strikes Reform Act), reducing penalties for some third‑strike offenses that are neither serious nor violent and creating a resentencing procedure (§ 1170.126).
Timothy Johnson (convicted 1998 of two counts of attempting to dissuade a witness) sought resentencing; that offense later had been classified as serious/violent (Proposition 21, 2000). Trial court denied; Court of Appeal affirmed.
Oscar Machado (convicted 1998 of first‑ and second‑degree burglary, sentenced consecutively) sought resentencing on the second‑degree burglary count; trial court denied because the first‑degree conviction is a serious felony. Court of Appeal reversed for reconsideration of the second‑degree count.
Core statutory text: § 1170.126 permits resentencing for inmates serving third‑strike terms for current felonies that are not defined as serious or violent; it includes exceptions mirroring the amended sentencing rules and grants courts discretion to deny resentencing if it would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.
The Supreme Court granted review to decide: (1) whether the classification of the current offense as serious/violent for resentencing is determined by law at time of the offense or as of Proposition 36’s effective date (Nov. 7, 2012), and (2) whether an inmate with both serious/violent and non‑serious/non‑violent current convictions can be resentenced as to the non‑serious count.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) For resentencing under §1170.126, is an offense characterized as serious/violent by law at the time of commission or by law as of Nov 7, 2012?	People: classification should be based on law as of Nov 7, 2012 (the Act’s effective date) — but they argued generally to uphold exclusions.	Johnson: classification should be based on law as of commission (1998); §1170.125’s date‑reference history supports using the law at time of offense.	Held: classification is determined as of Nov 7, 2012 (the effective date of Prop. 36); resentencing unavailable if the offense was serious/violent as of that date.
2) Can an inmate serving an indeterminate life term for a serious/violent felony obtain resentencing on a different current felony that is neither serious nor violent?	People: resentencing should be denied if any current felony is serious/violent — “sentence” refers to aggregate sentence, making inmate ineligible.	Machado: resentencing eligibility should be evaluated count‑by‑count; a non‑serious count can be resentenced despite another serious count.	Held: Resentencing eligibility is evaluated count‑by‑count; an inmate may obtain resentencing on a non‑serious/non‑violent count even if another current count is serious/violent.

People v. Williams, 34 Cal.4th 397 (review of Three Strikes sentencing and aggregate sentence concepts)
People v. Williams, 17 Cal.4th 148 (standards for dismissing prior strike convictions under §1385)
People v. Garcia, 20 Cal.4th 490 (a court may dismiss prior conviction allegations as to fewer than all counts; individualized consideration of counts)
Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537 (statutory date provisions affect which prior offenses qualify as strikes)
People v. Loeun, 17 Cal.4th 1 (interpretive guidance on verb tense and statutory construction)
People v. Jeffers, 43 Cal.3d 984 (verb tense not always determinative in statutory interpretation)