People v. Johnson
235 Cal. App. 4th 80
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Lamar Johnson committed multiple serious sexual offenses between 1983 and 1992, was imprisoned, and was scheduled for parole in 2011 when the San Mateo County DA sought civil commitment under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA).
- At trial four psychologists testified: two for the State diagnosed Johnson with “paraphilia not otherwise specified, with non-consenting persons” (referred to as paraphilic coercive disorder) and concluded he was likely to reoffend; two defense experts disputed that diagnosis and the risk assessments.
- The jury unanimously found Johnson an SVP; the trial court imposed an indeterminate commitment and denied his motion for a two-year term.
- Johnson appealed raising insufficiency of evidence, instruction errors (burden of proof and presumption), equal protection, and ex post facto/double jeopardy claims; he also filed habeas petitions after DSM-5’s publication arguing the new DSM undermined the paraphilic-coercive diagnosis and rendered the State’s evidence false.
- The Court of Appeal reviewed the record deference to the jury’s credibility and expert-weight determinations, rejected challenges to sufficiency and instructions, held equal protection and punitive-ness claims were foreclosed or unripe in light of precedent, and denied the habeas petitions, concluding DSM-5 did not negate a legally cognizable disorder or render expert testimony false.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Johnson is an SVP | Johnson: State experts relied on old offenses and unvalidated factors; no recent symptoms; risk not shown | State: Experts relied on DSM criteria, actuarial tools, and chronicity of disorder; history and expert opinion show substantial risk | Affirmed — substantial evidence supports SVP finding based on experts, tools, history, and chronic-disorder testimony |
| Jury instruction on "likely" standard and burden of proof | Johnson: CALCRIM No. 3454 misstated or confused standard by saying likelihood need not be >50%, reducing State's burden | State: Instruction proper and jurors can distinguish legal burdens; no reversible error | Affirmed — instruction read in context did not reduce beyond-reasonable-doubt burden |
| Presumption of innocence / presumption against SVP status | Johnson: SVPA requires presumption not an SVP until proven; court erred in excluding such instruction | State: Civil commitment is not a criminal trial; no constitutional presumption required; Beeson controls | Affirmed — no presumption-of-innocence instruction required in SVPA proceeding |
| Equal protection re: indefinite commitment and petition procedure | Johnson: SVPs treated worse than MDOs/NGIs (indefinite terms, burden to obtain release, ability to summarily deny petitions) | State: Differences justified; McKee proceedings already addressed similar claims; some challenges unripe until petition filed | Affirmed/declined — challenge to summary-denial provision unripe; indefinite commitment scheme upheld under McKee precedent |
| DSM-5 and habeas: DSM-5 undermines paraphilic coercive diagnosis / false evidence | Johnson: DSM-5 removed "nonconsenting persons" language and did not list paraphilic coercive disorder; new science (and Dr. Frances) shows diagnosis invalid, warranting habeas relief | State: DSM is not dispositive of legal definition; expert debate was litigated at trial; DSM-5 does not completely undermine State's case or make testimony false | Denied — DSM-5 does not negate a legally cognizable mental disorder for SVPA purposes; expert testimony not rendered false; habeas relief inappropriate unless evidence completely undermines the case |
Key Cases Cited
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (States may define mental abnormalities for civil commitment; psychiatric nomenclature need not match statutory terms)
- Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (Constitution requires some lack-of-control showing but permits States leeway in defining qualifying disorders)
- Hubbart v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.4th 1138 (1999) (California Supreme Court upholding SVPA against due process and equal protection challenges)
- People v. McKee, 47 Cal.4th 1172 (2010) (McKee I — similar equal protection challenges to SVPA; remand for factual hearing on justification for disparate treatment)
- In re Ghilotti, 27 Cal.4th 888 (2002) (explaining the meaning of "likely" to reoffend and standard for civil commitment risk)
- McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2010) (DSM does not control legal determination of mental disorder; factfinder decides probative weight of disputed diagnoses)