People v. Jackson, 170 N.E.3d 1075

Defendant Brandon Jackson was tried for the December 20, 2013 shooting death of Cuauhtemoc Estrada and attempted armed robbery of Rigoberto Anaya; the jury returned guilty verdicts and signed verdict forms with 12 signatures.
At defense counsel’s request the trial court polled the jury by asking, “Was this then and is this now your verdict?” but asked only 11 of the 12 jurors; all 11 answered "yes," and the court discharged the jury; defense did not object or raise the issue in a posttrial motion.
Jackson also received a lengthy sentencing proceeding; the court initially pronounced a 55-year term but the written sentence reflected a larger aggregate term (60 years on murder plus consecutive terms), and defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence.
On appeal Jackson argued the incomplete jury poll was plain error excusing forfeiture (second-prong plain error); he also raised two sentencing challenges (consideration of victim characteristics and a capricious increase in sentence).
The appellate majority held the omission to poll even a single juror is second-prong plain error because it implicates the integrity of the judicial process and reversed and remanded for a new trial; Justice Coghlan dissented relying on prior appellate precedent requiring more than the mere omission to show second-prong error.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court’s failure to poll all 12 jurors constitutes second-prong plain error excusing forfeiture	Forfeited; McGhee and Sharp support that incomplete polling absent other evidence of nonunanimity is not second-prong plain error	Even omitting one juror from a requested poll undermines the integrity of the judicial process and is second-prong plain error	Majority: Yes — failure to poll one juror is second-prong plain error; conviction reversed and remanded. Dissent: No — mere omission without evidence of nonunanimity is not second-prong error.
Whether the signatures on the verdict forms or other indicia can substitute for a complete poll	Signatures and lack of any protest show unanimity; no demonstration of prejudice	Polling is the only effective mechanism to confirm each juror’s assent; signatures do not substitute for oral confirmation	Majority: polling is required; signatures alone cannot substitute.
Sentencing challenges (use of victim characteristics; trial court’s change from 55 to 60 years)	Not reached on merits because conviction reversed; State had defended sentencing choices below	Defendant argued improper aggravation and an unexplained increase in sentence	Not decided — conviction reversed and remanded for a new trial, rendering sentencing issues moot for now.

People v. Kellogg, 77 Ill. 2d 524 (Ill. 1979) (polling must afford jurors a real opportunity to dissent; verdict cannot stand if poll precludes free expression)
People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252 (Ill. 1983) (trial court has duty when polling to determine that each juror’s vote is voluntary and accurately reflected)
People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (Ill. 2005) (second-prong plain error presumes prejudice because of the importance of the right; defendant bears burden to persuade error was serious)
People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173 (Ill. 2009) (analysis of Rule 431(b) and limits on structural-error analogies)
People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598 (Ill. 2010) (distinguishing errors that warrant structural or second-prong plain-error treatment)
People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445 (Ill. 2017) (describes the two-pronged plain-error test and presumption of prejudice for second-prong errors)
People v. Rehberger, 73 Ill. App. 3d 964 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (characterizes the right to poll as an absolute right basic to the unanimity requirement)
Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020) (unanimity is constitutionally required; underscores centrality of each juror’s vote)