2020 IL App (2d) 180353
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- Karlos E. Ingram was arrested July 31, 2017, released on bail, and his counsel filed a speedy-trial demand on August 1 (file-stamped Aug. 3).
- The case was continued several times by docket entry: Sept. 14 (continued by agreement), Oct. 19 (continued on State's motion to Nov. 1), and Nov. 1 (docket entry: “Motion for continuance by agreement”; case set for bench trial Feb. 1, 2018).
- The State later moved to advance/continue trial; Jan. 25, 2018 order reflects the court granted the motion “over Defendant’s objection” and notes defendant demanded speedy trial; later orders moved the trial to April 12, 2018.
- On April 2, 2018 Ingram moved to dismiss for violation of his statutory speedy-trial right, arguing that agreeing to a trial date within the speedy-trial period is mere acquiescence and not chargeable time (citing People v. Zeleny).
- The trial court found the Nov. 1 continuance was agreed to by defendant (not mere acquiescence), denied the motion to dismiss, convicted Ingram of battery after a bench trial, and he appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ingram’s agreement or acquiescence to a trial date/continuance that fell within the statutory speedy-trial period constitutes delay chargeable to the defendant | The continuance was “by agreement” and thus chargeable to defendant; trial court’s finding should stand | Agreement to a trial date within the speedy period is mere acquiescence (per Zeleny) and not a delay attributable to defendant, so the time should not be charged | Court affirmed: the trial court did not abuse its discretion; it found Ingram expressly agreed to the continuance (not mere acquiescence), so the time was chargeable and no speedy-trial violation was shown |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380 (2006) ("delay" includes any action that moves trial date outside the statutory window)
- People v. Zeleny, 396 Ill. App. 3d 917 (2009) (mere acquiescence to a date within the speedy-trial period is not delay attributable to defendant)
- People v. LaFaire, 374 Ill. App. 3d 461 (2007) (distinguishes agreeing to a date within the speedy period from agreeing to a continuance outside it)
- People v. Wynn, 296 Ill. App. 3d 1020 (1998) (distinguishes acquiescence to a suggested date from an express agreement to continue)
- People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81 (1998) (defense counsel’s express agreement to a continuance can be charged to defendant)
- People v. Workman, 368 Ill. App. 3d 778 (2006) (discusses scheduling/continuance distinctions referenced in LaFaire)
- People v. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d 209 (2000) (statutory speedy-trial right is a shield, not a means to evade prosecution)
- Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389 (1984) (appellant bears burden when record is incomplete; doubts resolved against appellant)