People v. Hronchak
2 Cal. App. 5th 884
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Christopher Hronchak was serving a 16‑month prison term for felony drug possession and was resentenced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, released with 360 days’ custody credit and ordered to one year of parole supervision.
- Within weeks of release he was convicted of a misdemeanor drug paraphernalia offense and a weapons offense, and failed to report to his parole agent and to provide a correct residence address.
- The supervising parole agency sought revocation under Penal Code §3000.08(f) after determining intermediate sanctions were inappropriate and filed a written report recommending 135 days’ custody.
- At the revocation hearing Hronchak admitted the violation; the trial court revoked and then reinstated parole conditioned on an additional 60 days in county jail (with credit).
- Hronchak appealed, arguing (1) the petition should have been denied for failure to adequately consider intermediate sanctions, and (2) the court lacked authority to impose additional custody that would cause total confinement to exceed the 364‑day misdemeanor maximum given Proposition 47’s “misdemeanor for all purposes” language.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the parole revocation petition adequately considered intermediate sanctions under §3000.08(f) and rule 4.541 | Parole agency justified revocation because it considered intermediate sanctions and explained why they were inappropriate | Hronchak: report failed to show individualized reasons; revocation improper without trying intermediate sanctions | Court: agency’s written report gave specific, individualized reasons (recent convictions, failure to comply, safety concerns); consideration requirement satisfied |
| Whether a resentenced misdemeanor under Prop 47 can be subject to additional custodial sanctions that result in aggregate custody exceeding 364 days | People: §1170.18(d) subjects resentenced defendants to one year parole and §3000.08(f),(g) authorizes and caps parole‑violation custody up to 180 days, independent of prior custody credit | Hronchak: ¶1170.18(k) makes resentenced convictions "misdemeanor for all purposes," so total custody cannot exceed misdemeanor maximum (364 days) | Court: §1170.18(d) creates a parole term and court jurisdiction to enforce it; additional custody for parole violations is authorized and may cause aggregate custody to exceed 364 days; upheld 60‑day sanction |
| Mootness of appeal after sanction and parole term completion | People: case likely moot because Hronchak completed the additional custody and likely completed parole | Hronchak: potential collateral consequences and the issue is capable of repetition but evading review | Court: exercised discretion to decide because issue is recurring, significant, and may evade review |
| Whether parole agency’s departure from evidence‑based tool (PVDMI) required more explanation | People: agency explained why it departed (recent convictions, weapons, noncompliance) | Hronchak: disparity with PVDMI recommendation suggested revocation was improper | Court: agency adequately explained why it departed from PVDMI; departure permissible with reasons provided |
Key Cases Cited
- Osorio v. Superior Court, 235 Cal.App.4th 1408 (Cal. Ct. App.) (mootness and adequacy of parole revocation report)
- Morales v. California, 63 Cal.4th 399 (Cal. 2016) (Proposition 47 parole term and justiciability of related issues)
- Williams v. Superior Court, 230 Cal.App.4th 636 (Cal. Ct. App.) (parole revocation report must state individualized reasons why intermediate sanctions are inappropriate)
- People v. Gonzalez, 60 Cal.4th 533 (Cal. 2014) (statutory construction principles)
- People v. Johnson, 61 Cal.4th 674 (Cal. 2015) (interpretation of voter‑adopted statutes applies usual canons)
- People v. Acosta, 29 Cal.4th 105 (Cal. 2002) (harmonizing statutory provisions)