74 Cal.App.5th 141
Cal. Ct. App.2021Background
- In 1989 Harry Lloyd Howard (age 25 at the time) was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life.
- Howard had parole hearings in 2009, 2012, and a youth-aware parole hearing in 2019 after SB 260; the Board denied parole but expressly considered youth-related mitigating evidence.
- In June 2020 Howard (pro se) filed a Franklin motion seeking a Franklin proceeding to preserve additional youth-related mitigating evidence for future parole hearings; he cited Penal Code §§ 3051, 4801, Franklin, and Cook.
- The superior court denied the Franklin motion on its face, concluding the existing record (including the 2019 hearing) already contained sufficient youth-related information and Howard failed to identify additional evidence.
- The Court of Appeal reversed, holding Howard’s motion met the minimal pleading threshold to initiate a Franklin proceeding and the trial court erred by denying it without first giving Howard an opportunity to proffer evidence.
- The matter was remanded with instructions that the trial court must allow Howard to describe or offer proof of relevant, noncumulative youth-related evidence before deciding whether further proceedings are warranted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Howard’s Franklin motion was legally sufficient to start a Franklin proceeding | The motion failed to show what additional youth-related evidence existed and the record already contained such evidence from the 2019 Board hearing | The motion met the minimal Cook/Lipptrapp requirements (case info, age, legal basis) and therefore should trigger a chance to preserve evidence | Motion was sufficient; court erred by denying on its face and must allow Howard to offer proof |
| Whether prior parole hearings that considered youth factors bar a Franklin proceeding | Prior parole hearing demonstrating youth factors means no further preservation is needed | A prior hearing does not preclude filing a Franklin motion later; Cook permits post-judgment motions | Prior hearings do not categorically bar a Franklin proceeding; court must still allow an opportunity to show additional noncumulative evidence |
| Whether failing to seek a Franklin proceeding before a parole hearing forfeits the right to a later Franklin motion | Failure to request Franklin earlier suggests no additional evidence exists and forecloses relief | A defendant may seek Franklin relief after hearings or after judgment; earlier inaction is not a categorical bar | Earlier failure is not dispositive; a later Franklin motion is permissible and must be considered |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (establishing procedure to preserve youth-related mitigating evidence for parole proceedings)
- In re Cook, 7 Cal.5th 439 (authorizing post-judgment Franklin motions and outlining motion framework)
- People v. Lipptrapp, 59 Cal.App.5th 886 (holding Franklin motions have a low pleading threshold and a simple pleading mechanism suffices)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (holding life without parole for nonhomicide juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (recognizing constitutional differences of juveniles in sentencing and invalidating mandatory LWOP for juveniles)
- People v. Caballero, 55 Cal.4th 262 (treating an extreme term as the functional equivalent of life without parole for juvenile offenders)