People v. Hopson, 219 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717

Background

In 2011 Laverna Brown was murdered; co-defendant Julius Thomas confessed to police implicating both himself and defendant Ruthetta Hopson, then later died by suicide in jail. Police recovered a machete Thomas led them to. Hopson was charged, tried, and convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to life without parole.
At pretrial the court tentatively excluded Thomas’s postarrest confession absent a sidebar if Hopson “opened the door” at trial; the prosecutor reserved the right to seek admission if Hopson’s testimony did so.
Hopson testified in her own defense, alleging Thomas acted alone, threatened her, and coerced her into helping clean up; she repeated many out-of-court statements Thomas allegedly made to explain her state of mind and conduct.
On redirect Hopson denied the truth of Thomas’s police confession (which she acknowledged knowing about). The prosecution then called Detective Wheeler in rebuttal to relate Thomas’s November 1 stationhouse confession in detail; no limiting instruction was requested or given.
The prosecutor relied on Thomas’s confession as substantive evidence in closing, arguing it proved Hopson’s role. Hopson contended admission of the unconfronted testimonial confession violated her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Hopson)	Held
Whether admission of Thomas’s postarrest confession violated Hopson’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right	Confession admissible as nonhearsay impeachment under Evid. Code §1202 and/or necessary to rebut or complete the record after Hopson’s testimony; prosecution used it to challenge Hopson’s credibility, not for truth	Unconfronted testimonial confession was offered for its truth (to prove Hopson’s role) and Crawford bars admission absent opportunity to cross-examine	The confession was used for its truth; admission violated Hopson’s confrontation right; Court reversed Court of Appeal and remanded for prejudice review
Whether Hopson “opened the door” so as to admit Thomas’s testimonial confession	Trial testimony placed Thomas’s statements and credibility at issue, justifying admission to rebut any misleading impression	Hopson did not open the door to admission of Thomas’s full, testimonial confession for substantive truth; limited nonhearsay uses would suffice	Majority: Hopson did not open the door to admit the full confession; post hoc opening-the-door justifications insufficient; no broad exception adopted
Whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt	Evidence other than the confession strongly supported guilt (cell data, purchases, physical evidence), so error was harmless	Confession was the only direct evidence of Hopson’s active role and was highly incriminating; thus error could be prejudicial	Court remanded to Court of Appeal to assess prejudice/harmlessness in the first instance
Proper scope of nonhearsay use under Crawford (i.e., when testimonial statements can be used non-substantively)	Thomas’s confession could have been used for permissible nonhearsay purposes (e.g., impeachment, explaining defendant’s state of mind)	The prosecution in fact used the confession substantively; nonhearsay limits do not rescue its admission	Court reaffirmed Crawford: testimonial statements may be admitted nonhearsay only when not offered for their truth and when the jury is not invited to credit them substantively

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial statements inadmissible against criminal defendant unless witness unavailable and defendant had prior opportunity for cross-examination)
Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (admission of accomplice confession permitted for limited nonhearsay rebuttal purpose when jury instructed and prosecutor confined argument to that purpose)
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Confrontation Clause guarantees right to confront witnesses)
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (prior reliability-based approach to testimonial hearsay; discussed and supplanted by Crawford)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (clarifies testimonial/question-based analysis for confrontation issues)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (further discussion of testimonial statements and confrontation-clause analysis)
People v. Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th 665 (2016) (two-step hearsay/Crawford analysis and limits on "not-for-the-truth" uses)
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (defendant who testifies may be impeached with evidence previously excluded if defendant’s testimony makes it relevant)
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda admissible to impeach defendant’s trial testimony)
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (Confrontation Clause may be waived; states may adopt procedural rules governing objections)
Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 2011) (credibility of accomplice confession relevant only if confession offered for its truth)