People v. Hernandez, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606

Townley Hernandez was convicted of attempted murder with related firearm enhancements.
The trial court sealed the plea-declaration transcripts and related sealed transcripts to protect witnesses from retaliation.
Defense counsel were denied access to Flores’s sealed declaration and the sealed plea transcripts, though Flores testified and led to impeachment opportunities.
Flores’s testimony was used for impeachment, with defense cross-examination aided by Flores’s declaration being produced for cross-examination purposes.
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the sealing order violated Townley’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel with no prejudice shown.
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the right to counsel is not automatically violated and prejudice must be shown unless a Geders-like presumption applies.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the sealing order violated the Sixth Amendment automatically	Townley argues automatic reversal due to denial of counsel access.	Hernandez contends no automatic reversal; prejudice analysis required.	Not automatic; prejudice inquiry required.
Whether standard for relief is prejudice under Strickland/Cronic rather than per se reversal	Townley asserts prejudice must be presumed under Geders/Cronic rules.	Hernandez argues standard should be prejudice-based, not per se.	Prejudice must be shown unless circumstances trigger a presumption; here not per se.
Whether the restriction prevented meaningful adversarial testing warranting presumptive prejudice	Townley contends the restriction impaired adversarial testing.	Hernandez argues counsel still opposed the prosecution and exercised cross-examination.	Not a presumption; prejudice must be shown with Strickland analysis.
Whether the restriction constitutes complete denial of the assistance of counsel as in Geders/Perry	Townley asserts Geders-like per se reversal.	Hernandez argues Geders-Perry distinction does not apply here.	Restriction was not a complete denial; no per se reversal.

Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (U.S. 1976) (severe restriction during trial may violate Sixth Amendment; supports presumptions in some cases)
Cronic v. United States, 466 U.S. 648 (U.S. 1984) (effective assistance not required to show prejudice in some circumstances; presumes unfair trial if counsel unable to test prosecution)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes deficient performance and resulting prejudice standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Gonzalez-Lopez v. Office of Roman, 548 U.S. 140 (U.S. 2006) (distinguishes right to counsel of choice from right to fair trial; prejudice inquiry not needed for denial of counsel of choice)
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (U.S. 1989) (limits Geders interpretation; not all restrictions on counsel trigger per se reversal)
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (U.S. 2002) (clarifies when prejudice not required to show in ineffective assistance context)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (U.S. 1986) (due process considerations for impeachment evidence; prejudice depends on factors)