People v. Henderson, C088883A

Background

Defendant Kejhonne Henderson shot and killed J.P. at a Sacramento house party and also shot a surviving victim; a jury convicted him of second degree murder and attempted murder and found true personal-discharge firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53(d)).
Important evidence included eyewitness identifications, a blue hooded sweatshirt with defendant’s DNA and gunpowder residue, and gang-related testimony about comments defendant made about "the Heights."
During voir dire three African-American prospective jurors expressed concerns about law enforcement and that defendant’s age/race might remind them of relatives; the court excused two for cause and kept one.
Midtrial, a seated juror (Juror No. 2) had an innocuous coffee-shop encounter with an acquaintance of defense counsel; inconsistent accounts followed and the court excused the juror under Penal Code §1089.
Defense counsel alleged the prosecutor contacted the Conflict Criminal Defenders (CCD) about ancillary funding requests and later argued the defense could have tested evidence; defense counsel sought to prepare a Franklin packet for future youth-offender parole consideration but never filed one.
The court affirmed convictions, reversed/remanded only to permit the trial court to consider striking/reducing the §12022.53(d) firearm enhancement under People v. Tirado.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Henderson)	Held
Excusal of African‑American prospective jurors for cause	Jurors who say system is unfair may be actually biased and unable to follow law; excusal proper when impartiality is doubtful	Systemic exclusion of jurors who express distrust of the system produces a non‑representative jury; belief that system treats Blacks unfairly alone is not cause	Court: A juror’s generalized belief that the system is unfair is not by itself cause for exclusion, but here the record (demeanor and statements about sympathy/bias and inability to consider graphic evidence) supported excusal of two jurors; no cross‑section violation.
Discharge of seated juror under §1089 (coffee‑shop encounter)	Juror was untruthful about statements to the stranger; conflicting accounts justified discharge	Trial court lacked demonstrable‑reality evidence that juror could not perform duties; removal erroneous	Court: Removal was erroneous under the heightened demonstrable‑reality standard because the record did not show juror lied or was unable to serve; error was harmless under Watson.
Prosecutor’s contact with CCD & comments about defense access to testing	Prosecutor had legitimate interest/info and testimony about defense access to testing was proper rebuttal; no misconduct that prejudiced defendant	Prosecutor improperly obtained confidential/privileged CCD information and capitalized on defense’s indigence; claim was forfeited and, alternatively, not shown to be prejudicial	Court: Claim forfeited for failure to timely litigate; no ineffective‑assistance showing on direct appeal; trial court did not abuse Evid. Code §352 in allowing testimony that defense could access testing and prosecutor’s argument was not improper.
Circumstantial‑evidence instruction choice (CALCRIM 224 v. 225)	CALCRIM No. 225 appropriate because intent mostly at issue	Defendant argued identity and other elements substantially rested on circumstantial evidence so CALCRIM No. 224 required	Court: CALCRIM No. 225 proper; eyewitness (direct) ID was primary so circumstantial evidence was corroborative, not the sole basis.
Failure to file Franklin packet / ineffective assistance claim	(People) No showing counsel’s omission was deficient or prejudicial; record does not establish helpful materials existed	(Henderson) Counsel promised and failed to file Franklin materials to preserve youth‑related mitigating evidence for parole; omission was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial	Court: On direct appeal, the record does not show counsel had no tactical justification; claim better suited to habeas where counsel can explain. Court did not find ineffective assistance on this record.
Firearm‑enhancement reduction under §12022.53	Trial court exercised discretion; no reduction required	Remand to allow consideration of striking/reducing enhancement under Tirado	Court: Remanded to permit trial court to consider striking §12022.53(d) under §12022.53(h) and §1385 and, if struck, imposing a lesser enhancement per People v. Tirado.

Key Cases Cited

People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016) (trial court may receive post‑sentencing materials to develop record for youth offender parole hearings)
People v. Tirado, 12 Cal.5th 688 (2022) (trial court may, when striking a §12022.53(d) enhancement, impose a lesser uncharged §12022.53(b) or (c) enhancement)
People v. Armstrong, 6 Cal.5th 735 (2019) (juror bias standard: juror may be excused if views would prevent or substantially impair performance of duties; discussion of demonstrable‑reality review)
People v. Cleveland, 25 Cal.4th 466 (2001) (appellate review of juror discharge; prejudicial‑error analysis)
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (juror exclusion for views on capital punishment and related impartiality principles)
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (constitutional standard for juror disqualification where views would substantially impair duties)
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (representative cross‑section principle; systemic exclusion is unconstitutional)
United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936) (impartiality as a state of mind; no fixed formula for its ascertainment)
People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 (1956) (harmless‑error standard applied to nonconstitutional error)
People v. Ledesma, 39 Cal.4th 641 (2006) (trial court deference on juror demeanor and voir dire; standards for reviewing juror challenges)