People v. Harris
234 Cal. App. 4th 671
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- On Oct. 16, 2012 Anthony Harris was stopped, arrested for suspected DUI (signs of stimulant use and poor driving); deputy advised him under California’s implied-consent admonition and Harris said “okay.”
- Harris’s blood was drawn at the sheriff’s station by a phlebotomist while Harris was in custody; deputy observed the draw and placed the sample in the station depository.
- Harris moved to suppress the blood-test results, arguing the warrantless draw violated the Fourth Amendment under McNeely/Schmerber and that any “consent” was coerced by implied-consent consequences.
- Trial court denied suppression; the superior court appellate division affirmed on consent grounds and reasonableness of the draw; this court transferred the appeal to resolve statewide issues and ordered supplemental briefing.
- The Supreme Court of California (Fourth Appellate District Division Two) affirmed: (1) actual, voluntary consent after implied-consent admonition can satisfy the Fourth Amendment; (2) the draw here was reasonable in manner; and (3) alternatively, the good-faith exception applies because police relied on pre-McNeely California precedent.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Harris’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a warrantless blood draw after implied-consent advisement can be lawful without a case-specific exigency | Consent is an established exception to the warrant requirement; Harris actually consented | McNeely/Schmerber require a warrant or case-specific exigency for nonconsensual blood draws; implied-consent warnings coerce so cannot produce valid Fourth Amendment consent | Actual, voluntary consent given after an implied-consent admonition satisfies the Fourth Amendment; McNeely did not foreclose consensual draws |
| Whether advisement of penalties under implied-consent law renders consent coerced | Advisement does not automatically make consent involuntary; driver retains a real choice | Advisement of suspension/penalties is coercive per Bumper-style analysis and invalidates consent | Advisement of consequences does not per se invalidate consent; voluntariness is judged under the totality of circumstances and here consent was voluntary |
| Whether the manner and setting of the blood draw (station, phlebotomist, handcuffs) violated Schmerber reasonableness requirement | The blood was drawn by a trained phlebotomist using routine, sanitary technique; no evidence of pain/infection risk | Schmerber contemplates hospital/medical setting and authorized personnel; station draw and restraints risk undue intrusion | The draw was reasonable under Schmerber’s standard (no undue risk or pain); non-hospital draws are not per se unconstitutional |
| Whether suppression is required if McNeely would render the draw unconstitutional (good-faith exception) | Even if McNeely applies, officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on controlling pre-McNeely California precedent allowing warrantless draws based on probable cause and dissipation; exclusion would not deter | Officers should have followed federal constitutional requirements; good-faith cannot apply when state law conflicted with Supreme Court precedent | Good-faith exception applies: police reasonably followed long-standing California precedent; excluding evidence would not serve deterrence purposes |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (United States Supreme Court) (recognizes blood draws are searches and permits warrantless draw when emergency/exigency justifies delay for warrant and when performed in reasonable medical manner)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (United States Supreme Court) (natural dissipation of alcohol is not per se exigency; exigency must be shown case-by-case)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (United States Supreme Court) (consent is an established exception to the warrant requirement; voluntariness determined under totality of circumstances)
- South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (United States Supreme Court) (use of implied-consent penalties does not necessarily render a choice coerced for Fifth Amendment purposes; warnings can produce an informed choice)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (United States Supreme Court) (good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for objectively reasonable reliance on binding legal authority)
- Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (United States Supreme Court) (searches done in objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent are not subject to exclusionary rule; deterrence analysis governs suppression)