People v. Hammond
2011 IL 110044
| Ill. | 2011Background
- Consolidated appeal: Alberty (Cook County) argues probation officer lacked authority to file a petition for violation of probation; Hammond/Donahue/Gaither (Livingston County) involve petitions to revoke probation filed by State’s Attorney and use of the Administrative Sanctions Program (ASP).
- Statutes central to dispute: 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(i) authorizes offering intermediate sanctions in lieu of filing a violation of probation; 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1 requires a system of structured sanctions; section 5-6-4(e) preserves judicial control over revocation decisions.
- Issue in Livingston cases: whether the probation department’s offer of intermediate sanctions can foreclose or delay revocation proceedings and how ASP interacts with prosecutorial discretion.
- Procedural posture: appellate courts held the probation officer may file a petition for violation of probation and that the State’s Attorney cannot veto sanctions; the supreme court consolidates the cases and affirms.
- Court’s focus: statutory construction of 5-6-4(i) and separation of powers, with analysis of whether probation officers’ actions impermissibly delegate judge-like authority to the executive/probation department.
- Result: probation officers have authority to file violations; 5-6-4(i) does not give State’s Attorney veto power over intermediate sanctions; judgments affirmed across Alberty, Hammond, Gaither, and Donahue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority of probation officers to file VOP petitions | Alberty argues officers lack authority | State argues 5-6-4(i) contemplates sanctions but not veto | Probation officers may file VOP petitions. |
| Constitutionality of 5-6-4(i) re separation of powers | State contends 5-6-4(i) infringes on prosecutorial powers | Court rules maintain separation by keeping discretion with judiciary | Statute does not violate separation of powers; no veto by State’s Attorney. |
| Effect of intermediate sanctions on timing of revocation | State argues sanctions could be bypassed or circumvented | Sanctions program structured to avoid revocation for same violation | Completion of sanctions bars revocation for the same violation. |
| Role of ASP rules and circuit court oversight | State critiques local rules as procedural hurdles | ASP provisions structure discretion and provide judicial review | ASP framework valid; not violative of separation of powers. |
| Whether the ruling applies to all three Livingston cases and Alberty | N/A (pleaded collectively) | N/A | Rule applies to all; judgments affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987) (separation-of-powers overlapping powers accepted)
- Phillips v. People, 66 Ill. 2d 412 (1977) (probation authority and treatment not infringing court’s sentencing power)
- In re D.S., 198 Ill.2d 309 (2001) (circuit court may order prosecution in best interests of minor; separation not absolute)
- In re T.W., 101 Ill.2d 438 (1984) (probation officer consent implicated judicial function; overlap recognized)
- People v. Walker, 119 Ill.2d 465 (1988) (separation of powers not a total divorce; overlaps allowed)
- Phillips v. People, 66 Ill.2d 412 (1977) (statutory scheme permits nonjudicial action without violating sentencing authority)
