People v. Green
2020 IL App (5th) 170462
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- Michael Green (age 22 at offense) was convicted of first‑degree murder for the death of 2‑year‑old Z.H.; medical evidence showed skull fracture, brain swelling, bilateral retinal hemorrhages, broken ribs, liver laceration, and other blunt‑force injuries; Green admitted punching the child and hitting her off a counter.
- Green was sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment (within the discretionary range).
- Green filed an initial pro se postconviction petition raising ineffective‑assistance claims; it was summarily dismissed and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal.
- In 2017 Green moved for leave to file a successive postconviction petition arguing (1) his 60‑year sentence was unconstitutional as a young adult under Miller/Harris/House and the Illinois proportionate‑penalties clause, and (2) actual innocence based on new scientific developments challenging shaken‑baby/abusive‑head‑trauma testimony; he also alleged related ineffective‑assistance claims.
- The circuit court denied leave, finding Green failed to show prejudice under the cause‑and‑prejudice test and that his actual‑innocence claim (and related ineffective‑assistance claims) were not cognizable. Green appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Green) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a 22‑year‑old may invoke Miller (juvenile sentencing) to challenge a 60‑year discretionary sentence under the Eighth Amendment | Green: Youth/adolescent brain science (and cases like House/Harris I) mean his sentence is a de facto life term and Miller‑type protections should apply | State: Green was an adult (22); Miller protects only juveniles; sentence was discretionary and constitutional | Court: Miller does not apply to adults; 60‑year discretionary sentence constitutional; claim fails |
| Whether Green’s discretionary 60‑year sentence violates Illinois' proportionate‑penalties clause as‑applied | Green: Young adulthood and new neuroscience warrant resentencing under proportionate‑penalties clause (relying on House) | State: Sentence discretionary; Green directly participated in murder; House is distinguishable because it involved mandatory life and accountability theory | Court: Claim fails as a matter of law — Green was adult, directly participated, received discretionary sentence after PSI and argument; House does not control |
| Whether newly discovered scientific developments about shaken baby syndrome establish actual innocence | Green: Advances undermine the medical testimony that supported guilt; this is newly discovered evidence that would probably change a retrial result | State: Medical and testimonial evidence (injuries and Green’s admissions) independently establish guilt; new science is not conclusive exonerating evidence | Court: New evidence not of conclusive character; would not probably change result on retrial; actual‑innocence gateway not met |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate/present shaken‑baby research and appellate counsel ineffective for not raising it | Green: Trial and direct‑appeal counsel should have used available research to challenge medical causation | State: Any such evidence was available earlier and could have been raised in the first postconviction petition; overwhelming evidence and Green’s admissions negate prejudice | Court: No cause shown for not raising earlier; no Strickland prejudice given overwhelming independent evidence; ineffective‑assistance claims fail |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (juveniles: Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory life without parole; consider youth and attendant characteristics)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑prong ineffective‑assistance test: performance and prejudice)
- People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (Miller applies to discretionary life without parole for juveniles)
- People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932 (Miller limited to juveniles; 18 is legal line separating juveniles from adults)
- People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711 (successive postconviction relief: actual‑innocence gateway and cause‑and‑prejudice framework)
- People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444 (codifying cause‑and‑prejudice test for successive petitions)
- People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307 (standard for whether newly discovered evidence would probably change result on retrial)
- People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319 (requirements for newly discovered evidence in actual‑innocence claims)
- People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (adoption of Strickland test in Illinois)