People v. Garrison
495 Mich. 362
| Mich. | 2014Background
- Defendant Chad James Garrison pleaded guilty to larceny (snowmobiles and trailers) after stealing property from vacation homes; three victims traveled to recover property and attend a restitution hearing.
- Victims claimed $1,125 in travel expenses (2,250 miles at $0.50/mi); the trial court awarded $977 over defense objection.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on People v Jones, concluding the CVRA (MCL 780.766) and MCL 769.1a do not authorize reimbursement for victims’ travel expenses.
- Prosecution sought leave; the Michigan Supreme Court granted review and heard oral argument.
- The Supreme Court majority held the statutes require ordering "full restitution," which permits awarding reasonable travel expenses that are direct results of the defendant’s course of conduct; it reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to reinstate the original restitution order.
- A dissent (Markman, J.) argued the statutory scheme’s specific subsections define and limit what constitutes restitution, that express statutory provisions allowing travel reimbursement in other narrow contexts (e.g., MCL 780.766b, parents/minors, third-party services) imply exclusion for victims generally, and that the Court should not expand restitution beyond legislative text.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CVRA (MCL 780.766) and MCL 769.1a authorize restitution for victims’ travel expenses incurred to recover property or attend hearings | Statutes require courts to order "full restitution" (complete, maximal), which includes reasonable travel expenses that directly result from the defendant’s course of conduct | Restitution lists in subsections are the operative limits; "full restitution" must be defined by the specific items listed — travel is not listed for victims and is only authorized in narrow provisions | Yes. Court held "full restitution" authorizes reasonable travel expenses when they are a direct result of the defendant’s conduct; reinstated $977 award |
| Whether subsections (3)-(5) are exhaustive limits on restitution for property or personal-injury victims | Subsections are complementary guidance for valuation, not exhaustive lists; definition of "victim" includes financial harm and supports broader restitution | Specific, detailed subsections and other statutes awarding travel in narrow cases indicate legislative intent to exclude travel for victims generally | Subsections are not exhaustive; sentencing courts may award other restitution reasonably resulting from the offense |
| Whether precedent (People v Jones) controls | Statutory changes ("may" → "shall" and constitutional victim-rights amendment) changed law such that Jones is no longer controlling | Jones remains instructive about statutory limits; changes don’t authorize new categories without legislative action | Jones is distinguishable; mandatory "full restitution" language and constitutional amendments justify a different result |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Jones, 168 Mich. App. 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (prior decision holding restitution did not include victims’ travel expenses)
- People v Kolanek, 491 Mich. 382 (Mich. 2012) (statutory interpretation precedent)
- People v Osantowski, 481 Mich. 103 (Mich. 2008) (statutory interpretation/standard of review principles)
- People v Armstrong, 490 Mich. 281 (Mich. 2011) (restitution and statutory interpretation context)
- Bianchi v Auto Club of Mich, 437 Mich. 65 (Mich. 1991) (interpretive canon regarding statutory construction)
- People v Peters, 449 Mich. 515 (Mich. 1995) (legislative purpose and victims’ rights context)