34 Cal. App. 5th 270
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2019Background
- Defendant Roberto Flores was tried separately for (1) attempted murder/assault of a police officer after driving a car that struck the officer while Flores was on bail, and (2) manufacturing/possession of an assault weapon after family members discovered a cache of weapons.
- At both trials Flores repeatedly told counsel he did not want to admit the charged acts (he denied driving the car and denied possessing/assembling the weapon).
- Defense counsel nonetheless conceded the actus reus at each trial (admitting Flores drove the car and had worked on/possessed the gun) while arguing lack of requisite mental state (no premeditation; lack of knowledge the weapon was an assault weapon).
- Juries convicted Flores on the attempted murder/assault counts and the weapons counts; he received an aggregate sentence of 29 years to life.
- On appeal Flores argued, invoking McCoy v. Louisiana, that counsel’s concessions of the factual commission of the crimes over his express objections violated his Sixth Amendment right to control the objective of his defense and required reversal as structural error.
Issues
| Issue | Flores' Argument | People’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel may concede a defendant committed the acts alleged (actus reus) over the defendant’s express objection | Concession of actus reus over my express insistence on factual innocence violated my Sixth Amendment right to set the fundamental objective of the defense (control over asserting innocence) | Conceding the acts can be a reasonable, strategic decision to obtain acquittal; this is counsel’s province after pleading | Court: McCoy controls—when a defendant repeatedly and unambiguously insists on maintaining factual innocence, counsel may not concede the actus reus over that objection; reversal required |
| Whether McCoy’s rule is limited to capital cases | McCoy’s autonomy rule applies regardless of capital status; defendant’s right to set trial objective is not cabined to death-penalty contexts | McCoy involved a capital case and emphasized death-penalty stakes; People contend it may be limited to capital cases | Court: McCoy is not limited to capital cases; its principle applies in noncapital prosecutions as well |
| Whether the error is structural (automatic reversal) or subject to harmless-error review | The concession over express objection is structural and requires reversal without harmless-error analysis | Even if error, it may be reviewed for prejudice (harmlessness) because counsel’s concession was reasonable given overwhelming evidence | Court: Error is structural under McCoy and requires reversal; no harmless-error analysis applied |
Key Cases Cited
- McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (criminal defendant has Sixth Amendment right to insist counsel not concede guilt; counsel may not concede actus reus over client’s express objection)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to indigent defendants)
- Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (the accused, not counsel, is master of his own defense; distinguishing counsel-controlled choices)
- Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009) (state-court discussion recognizing counsel’s concession over defendant’s insistence of innocence raises constitutional concerns)
- State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138 (Kan. 2000) (similar state-court holding that counsel cannot admit client’s involvement when client adamantly maintains innocence)
- People v. Eddy, 33 Cal. App. 5th 472 (2019) (California appellate application of McCoy reversing a murder conviction in a noncapital case)