People v. Fiveash
2015 IL 117669
| Ill. | 2015Background
- In 2012 David Fiveash (age 23) was indicted in Cook County for sexual assaults allegedly committed against his 6‑year‑old cousin in 2003 when he was 14–15.
- Police received the tip in April 2012 from Indiana authorities; Fiveash gave statements and was indicted days after local police learned of the allegations.
- Fiveash moved to dismiss, arguing 705 ILCS 405/5‑120 (Juvenile Court Act) gives juvenile court "exclusive jurisdiction" for offenses committed under age 17, so because he was a minor when the acts occurred prosecution in adult court was barred—even though he was over 21 at indictment.
- The trial court granted dismissal, reasoning Fiveash could not be prosecuted in juvenile court (over 21) nor in adult court (statutory bar), but the appellate court reversed, holding section 5‑120 does not bar prosecution of adults charged after age 21 for offenses committed before age 17.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the appellate court: because the Act defines "minor" as a person under 21 "subject to this Act," the statutory bar in section 5‑120 applies only to persons who are both under 21 and subject to the Act at the time proceedings are instituted; Fiveash was over 21 and not subject to the Act when charged.
- The Court also relied on the extended statute of limitations for child sexual offenses (720 ILCS 5/3‑6(j)) and statutory transfer provisions, and rejected due process and lenity challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether section 5‑120 bars adult criminal prosecution of offenses committed when defendant was under 17 but charged after he turned 21 | State: section 5‑120 does not apply because defendant was over 21 and not "subject to this Act" when charged | Fiveash: section 5‑120’s plain language bars prosecution for acts committed under 17 unless an exception applies, so he cannot be tried in adult court even if charged after 21 | Held: section 5‑120 does not bar prosecution; the juvenile‑court exclusivity applies only to persons under 21 "subject to this Act" when proceedings are instituted |
| Whether the Act’s definitions ("minor" = person under 21 subject to this Act) should be imported into section 5‑120 | State: statutory definitions control and must be applied | Fiveash: legislature intended "minor" simply as a gender‑neutral word meaning under 17, not the Act’s defined term | Held: statutory definition controls; "minor" incorporates the Act’s definition (under 21 and subject to Act) |
| Whether rule of lenity or ambiguity requires construing 5‑120 in favor of defendant | Fiveash: construction ambiguous and should favor defendant under lenity | State: language is unambiguous when read with definitions; lenity inapplicable | Held: statute is sufficiently clear; lenity does not apply |
| Whether prosecution here violates due process because adult penalties exceed juvenile sanctions | Fiveash: substantially harsher adult punishments violate due process | State: prior precedents (e.g., Patterson) reject such due process claims; transfer provisions could have sent him to adult court when he was a juvenile | Held: due process claim rejected; sentencing disparity does not bar prosecution; statutory transfer regime and legislative intent allow adult prosecution when charged after 21 |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d 526 (Illinois Supreme Court) (juvenile‑court jurisdiction principles cited)
- In re Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d 295 (Illinois Supreme Court) (jurisdictional and procedural issues in juvenile proceedings)
- People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102 (Illinois Supreme Court) (upholding automatic transfer scheme and rejecting similar due process claim)
- People v. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 1 (Illinois Supreme Court) (transfer hearing and sentencing disparity considerations)
- People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395 (Illinois Supreme Court) (legislature defines juvenile court limits; no constitutional right to juvenile proceedings)
- In re Griffin, 92 Ill. 2d 48 (Illinois Supreme Court) (statutory timing for commitment/juvenile provisions)
- In re Greene, 76 Ill. 2d 204 (Illinois Supreme Court) (age as authorization for juvenile system, not element of delinquency)
- People v. Ellis, 57 Ill. 2d 127 (Illinois Supreme Court) (gender‑based age distinctions in juvenile prosecution invalid)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (U.S. Supreme Court) (juvenile culpability considerations cited)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. Supreme Court) (limitations on severe juvenile sentences cited)