People v. Finney, 328 P.3d 205

Finney, charged in 2003 with multiple class 3 and class 4 felony sexual assaults, pursued a procedural path including multiple deferred-judgment agreements.
July 2004 plea: one class 4 felony considered for four-year deferred judgment, with potential withdrawal and dismissal of all charges if conditions met; penalties stated as 2 years to life with 3 years parole in advisement.
August 2004 presentence report described penalties as 2 years to lifetime imprisonment and recommended deferral.
September 2004 second judge declined the plea, and the case was reset for trial.
November 2004 third judge imposed a second deferred judgment: plead guilty to one class 4 felony and one class 3 misdemeanor; felony deferred with life imprisonment possible; defendant initially objected based on mitigation; later the plea was not accepted and trial reset.
February 2005 fourth judge accepted a guilty plea to one class 4 felony and one class 1 misdemeanor, with four-year deferred judgment for the felony, 90 days in jail, probation, sex-offender treatment, and concurrent misdemeanor probation; penalties stated as two years to life plus three years mandatory parole, though the attached paperwork alleged 10 years; defendant acknowledged understanding penalties would not apply unless he violated the deferred judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Crim. P. 11 applies to revocation when advisement was waived.	Finney argues Crim. P. 11 requires advisement in revocation.	Finney contends waiver of advisement eliminates Crim. P. 11 applicability.	Crim. P. 11 does not apply in this revocation context where advisement was waived.
Whether plea counsel could waive statutory rights to penalties in revocation proceedings.	Finney asserts waiver of advisement rights should not bar due process.	Plea counsel validly waived in defendant's presence.	Plea counsel could waive statutory rights under applicable precedent.
Whether due process required the revocation court to advise of penalties before admitting violation.	Finney claimed a due process requirement to be advised of penalties before admission.	Record reflects waiver and prior advisements; due process satisfied.	Due process was satisfied given prior advisements and waiver of formal advisement.
Whether the postconviction proceedings and sentencing were properly conducted given advisement waiver.	Finney contends continuance and mitigating evidence were improperly limited.	Court did not abuse discretion given the record and statutory framework.	No reversible error; sentencing upheld with mittimus correction later.
Whether the mittimus incorrectly stated the parole term.	Parole term should reflect ten years to life.		Mittimus corrected to reflect ten-year-to-life parole term.

People v. Widhalm, 642 P.2d 498 (Colo.1982) (importance of clear written stipulations in deferred judgments)
People v. Allen, 973 P.2d 620 (Colo.1999) (probation-revocation safeguards; waiver of certain protections)
Marler v. People, 139 Colo. 23, 336 P.2d 101 (Colo.1959) (plea validity when advised by counsel under Crim. P. 11)
Minich v. People, 8 Colo. 440, 9 P. 4 (1885) (waiver of reading can serve function of informing defendant)
Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248 (Colo.2011) (Crim. P. 11 generally satisfies due process)
People v. Wright, 53 P.3d 730 (Colo. App.2002) (probation-admission valid despite lack of advisement)
People v. Jones, 997 P.2d 1286 (Colo. App.1999) (advisement not required for certain probation admissions)
Allen (federal case cited), United States v. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.2003) (probation revocation proceedings do not require full Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy)