Lead Opinion
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In Sаnchez-Martines v. People, No. 09CV578, the Adams County District Court reversed the county court's order vacating petitioner Nicanor Sanchez-Martinez's guilty plea to third degree assault as unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. We granted certiorari, and reverse.
In January 2008, the Northglenn Police Department ("NPD") responded to complaints of a fight occurring in the apartment of petitioner Nicanor Sanchez-Martinez. Based on allegations made by his wife, Sanchez-Martinez was charged with third degree assault and misdemeanor menacing, both of which were charged as acts of domestic violence.
Appearing pro se before Magistrate Bowen of the Adams County Court, Sanchez-Martinez pleaded guilty to third degree assault
Subsequently, in February 2009, Sanchez-Martinez brought a Crim. P. 35(c) motion requesting that his guilty plea be set aside, in light of new evidence that allegedly negated his guilt. At the hearing on the Rule 35(c) motion, the prosecution elicited testimony from the defendant establishing that he cannot read or write in Spanish or English, was never informed of the constitutional rights he waived by pleading guilty, and pleaded guilty because he believed that he would be incarcerated otherwise.
As a result, during the hearing Adams County Court Magistrate Mole expressed his concern that Sanchez-Martines did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. At the conclusion of the hearing, Magistrate Mole also informed both parties that, taking the matter under advisеment, he would likely set aside the guilty plea as unconstitutional. In a subsequent written order, he did so, and the prosecution appealed to the Adams County District Court.
The district court reversed the county court, concluding that the County Court improperly addressed the constitutionality of Sanchez-Martinez's guilty plea. It concelud-ed that the court addressed the issue of an involuntary, unknowing, unintelligent guilty plea without providing notice, in violation of the prosecution's "right to due process."
Because we determine that the county court provided the prosecution with adequate notice of its concerns about the constitutionality of the guilty plea, we do not reach the issue of whether the prosecution waived its right to claim lack of notice or whether the prosecution has such a right. We hold that the county court acted within its discretion when it addressed the constitutionality of Sanchez-Martinez's guilty рlea based on evidence at the hearing. Finally, we also hold that the record supports the county court's findings and conclusion that Sanchez-Martinez's guilty plea was unconstitutional.
1.
On January 12, 2008, NPD officers responded to a report of an argument in Sanchez-Martines's apartment in Northglenn, Colorado. Sanchez-Martinez and his wife, Adriana Munoz lived in the apartment with their two young children. Munoz claimed she confronted Sanchez-Martines after he struck one of their children several times. Munoz alleged that he then grabbed her neck, pushed her against the wall, punched her several times in the head, and threatened to kill her.
Sanchez-Martinez was arrested and charged with third degree assault, section 18-3-204, C.R.S. (2010), and misdemeanor menacing, section 18-8-206, C.R.S. (2010). The prosecution charged both counts as acts of domestic violence pursuant to section 18-6-801, C.R.S. (2010).
Four days later, on January 16, 2008, Sanchez-Martinez appеared pro se with the aid of an interpreter before the Adams County Court, Magistrate Brian N. Bowen, to enter a guilty plea pursuant to Crim. P. 11. After Magistrate Bowen listed the crimes with which Sanchez-Martines was charged, he asked whether Sanchez-Martinesz read, or had read to him, and signed, an advisal of rights form. When Sanchez-~Martinez indicated that he had not, Magistrate Bowen stopped the proceedings to give Sanchez, Martinez the opportunity to review and sign an advisal of rights form.
After the break, Magistrate Bowen conducted the Rule 11 colloquy. The transcript quoted below shows the Rule 11 colloquy in its entirety:
Magistrate Bowen: Okay. We're back on the record, ah, 08-M-218. Sir, have you now had an opportunity to read or have read to you and signed this advisal of rights form? Oops. One more time. Okay, sir, have you now had the opportunity to either read or have read to you and signed this advisal of rights form.
Sanchez-Martinez: Yes.
*1252 Magistrate Bowen: Do you have any questions regarding your rights?
Sanchez-Martinez: I'm wondering if I can get the PR bond and then go to alcohol classes.
Magistrate Bowen: Okay. Well, let me talk to you about what this paper says and we'll go, then I'll try to answer your question. The district attorney says that upon a plea of guilty to assault in the third degree and domestic violence, that they would dismiss the other charges on your case.
Sanchez-Martinezs: Okay.
Magistrate Bowen: If they do that, the maximum possible penalty here is five thousand dollars and/or two years in the county jail, with thirty-six weeks of domestic violence classes. They have no objection to your getting probation and eredit for time served in this case. Is that your understanding?
Sanchez-Martinez: You mean that I have been incarcerated?
Magistrate Bowen: Yes, you have been incarcerated, but the People would have no objection to your being placed on probation.
Sanchez-Martinezs: Okay.
Magistrate Bowen: So if you're on probation, then there's no PR bond. Do you understand that, sir?
Sanchez-Martinez: What do you mean probation?
Magistrаte Bowen: Probation which, would mean that you would be able to return to the community under the supervision of the court, through the probation department. Rir, are you in agreement with that?
Sanchez-Martinez: Yes.
Magistrate Bowen: Okay, Then, as to assault in the third degree, if you were to enter a plea of guilty to that charge, you would be acknowledging that you did, within the State of Colorado, on or about the twelfth day of January 2001-excuse me-2008, knowingly or recklessly cause bodily injury to another person without affirmative defense or legal justification. Sir, is that your understanding?
Sanchez-Martinez: Yes.
Magistrate Bowen: So, as to 18-8-204, assault, and 18-6-801, domestic violence, sir, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?
Sanchez-Martinez: Guilty.
Magistrate Bowen: Do you understand that guilty means you did this; not guilty would mean you did not?
Sanchez-Martinez: Guilty means I did it?
Magistrate Bowen: Yes.
Sanchez-Martinez: Yes.
Magistrate Bowen: Did you do this?
Sanchez-Martinez: Yes.
Magistrate Bowen: Okay. Ah, has anyone promised you anything in order to have you enter this plea today?
Sanchez-Martinez: No.
Magistrate Bowen: Okay. Then, as to sentencing-counsel? (Question addressed to prosecuting counsel)
Thе court then sentenced him to a one-year term of probation and a sixty-day suspended jail sentence, and ordered him to pay a $500 fine and attend thirty-six sessions of domestic violence counseling.
On January 16, 2009, the Adams County Probation Department filed a petition with the Adams County Court to terminate Sanchez-Martinez's probation as successfully completed. On January 20, 2009, Magistrate Simon Mole granted the motion and terminated Sanchez-Martinez's term of probation.
On February 9, 2009, Sanchez-Martinez filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Crim. P. 85(c0)@)(V). The motion claimed that a mutual friend of both Sanchez-Martinesz and Munoz, Julia Diaz-Rojas, would testify that Munoz told her she fabricated her account of the events leading up to Sanchez-Martinesz's arrest. Diaz-Rojas would testify that Munoz lied to the police because she was concerned that her children would be taken away. It also alleged that Sаnchez-Martinez is inexperienced with the justice system and erroneously believed that failing to plead guilty would automatically result in a sentence of two years in county jail. It claimed that this new evidence required the court to vacate Sanchez-Martinez's conviction.
At the hearing, upon questioning by the prosecutiоn, Sanchez-Martinesz testified regarding the circumstances surrounding his guilty plea:
District Attorney: But you pled guilty to this charge in January of 20087
Sanchez-Martinez: Yes, because what I wanted to do is I wanted to get out, I wanted to go with my family, I didn't want to lose my job. Before we went into the court they sat me down with the interpreter and the DA or somebody, I think, and they say you're gonna plead guilty, ah huh, yes. That's when I told the judge that I was pleading guilty so he would let me out, and to pay and comply with everything else.
During the postconviction relief hearing, Sanchez-Martinez repeatedly testified that it was difficult to understand the Rule 11 proceedings because the interpreter was speaking too softly and too fast. He also testified that he pleaded guilty for fear of losing his job and because the district attorney told him he would be released if he did so. He stated that he faces deportation proceedings as a result of his conviction.
In rеsponse to questions asked by the prosecution and one question posed by the court, Sanchez-Martinez revealed that he cannot read or write in Spanish or English. He stated, "The only thing that I know to do is to draw my name."
When asked by the prosecution about the advisal of rights form he initialed and signed at the Rule 11 hearing, Sanchez-Martines testified that he signed the form without being informed of its contents:
District Attorney: And the interpreter went through this document with you?
Sanchez-Martinez: No. asked me to sign it. No, I-they only
District Attorney: You did sign it?
Sanchez-Martinez: Yeah, they told me to sign it. They didn't read it to me.
District Attorney: Did you tell anybody that you needed help reading it?
Sanchez-Martines: No, I did not. No, they did not they just gave me the document, interpreter gave me and he said sign here, here and that's-that was it.
Following closing statements by both parties, Magistrate Mole informed the parties that he was inclined to find Sanchez-Martinez's guilty plea unconstitutional:
I've been told this gentleman doesn't read Spanish or English, and I do find that beliеvable and credible. I don't think this was a knowing, voluntary plea by any stretch of the-of the imagination, and frankly, I'd set aside on those grounds. And I think there's ample record here for any review[ing] [sic] court to believe that there are other grounds for setting this aside. This was somebody who was solely focused on getting out, didn't have a clue what he was doing, couldn't hear the interpreter, couldn't read the Spanish disposition form that was offered him. So I'm frankly considering reviewing my notes to see whether I should set aside on those grounds.
In a subsequent written order, Magistrate Mole found Sanchez-Martinez's testimony credible. He concluded that Sanchez-Martinez could not have read and understood the written advisal of basic constitutional rights contained in the advisal of rights form, that the record did not show that he was advised of the elements of the offense he pleaded guilty to, and that he may have received ineffective interprеter services during the Rule 11 hearing. Ultimately, he concluded that the plea was not constitutionally sound and set aside Sanchez-Martinez's judgment of conviction pursuant to Crim. P. 85(c)(2)(I).
The district court concluded that the county court improperly considered the constitutionality of Sanchez-Martinez's plea because the issue had not been raised properly in the proceedings before Magistrate Mole. We granted certiorari, and reverse the district court.
IL.
Because we determine that the county court provided the prosecution with adequate notice of its concerns about the constitutionality of the guilty plea, we do not reach the issue of whether the prosecution waived its right to claim lack of notice or whether the prosecution has such a right. We hold that the county court acted within its discretion when it addressed the constitutionality of Sanchez-Martinez's guilty plea based on evidence at the hearing. Finally, we also hold that the record supports the county court's findings and conclusion thаt Sanchez-Martinez's guilty plea was unconstitutional.
A.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Whether a guilty plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent is a mixed question of law and fact. See People v. Kyler,
1. Guilty Pleas
"A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment." Boykin v. Alabama,
To ensure the constitutionality of guilty pleas, Crim. P. 11(b) outlines various determinations the court must make before accepting a guilty plea. Among other things, Rule 11 requires the trial court to ensure that (1) the defendant understands the nature of the charges against him, the elements of the offense, and the effect of his plea; (2) the plea is voluntary and not the result of undue influence or coercion; (8) the defendant understands the right to a jury trial and waives that right on all issues; (4) the defendant understands the possible penalty for the crime; and (5) there is a factual basis for the plea.
Rule 11 also requires the court to ensure that the defendant is advised of "all the rights set forth in [Crim. P.] 5(q)(@)." Crim. P. 11(b); see People v. Leonard,
Given the important rights at stake, to be constitutionally vаlid, a defendant must enter his guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See Kyler,
"The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Hill v. Lock-hart,
A defendant's false statements concerning his guilty plea made during a Rule 11 hearing do not automatically bar post-conviction relief on the grounds that his plea was unconstitutional. See Tovar Mendoza v. Hatch,
In the case of a non-English speaking defendant, providing an interpreter at the Rule 11 hearing can be important to ensuring that a guilty plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See People v. Ochou-Magana,
2. Post-Conviction Proceedings
Crim. P. 85(c)(2) allows a person convicted of a crime to petition the court for post-conviction relief on certain grounds. At issue in this case are the grounds for post-conviction relief found in Rule 85(c)(2)(I) and (V):
(I) that the conviction was obtained or sentence imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state;
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(V) that there exists evidence of material facts, not theretofore presented and heard, which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been known to or learned by the defendant or his attorney prior to the submission of the issues to the court or jury, and which requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.
Section 16-5-402, C.R.S. (2010), plaсes a statute of limitations on the filing of Rule 35(c) motions for post-conviction relief. As relevant to the instant case, the statute requires defendants convicted of misdemeanor offenses to file for post-conviction relief within eighteen months of the date of conviction. § 16-5-402(1). Sanchez-Martines timely filed his motion for post-conviction relief.
3. Crim. P. 52(b)
Crim. P. 52(b) provides that "[pliain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." The concept of plain error is predicated on the idea that the trial court "should have intervened sua sponte because the error was so obvious and prejudicial." People v. Mosley, 167 P.8d 157, 159 (Colo.App.2007) (citations omitted). A plain error so undermines the fundamental fairness of a proceeding that it casts serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. People v. Miller,
Crim. P. 52(b) is virtually identical to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), which provides that "a plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention." Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), appellate courts may raise sua sponte a critical issue affecting substantial rights. E.g., King v. United States,
B.
The Prosecution was on Notice that the Constitutionality of Sanchez-Martinez's Guilty Plea was at Issue.
We do not address whether the prosecution waived its lack of notice argument by failing to raise it before the county court, or whether the prosecution has a due process right to notice, because we conclude the prosecution was on notice that the constitutionality of Sanchez-Martines's plea would be at issue.
The prosecution incorrectly asserts that the county court spontaneously held a hearing on the constitutionality of the defendant's plea. Contrary to this assertion, the record shows that, of its own volition, the prosecution elicited the testimony from Sanchez-Martinez that initially raised the trial court's concern regarding the constitutionality of his plea. The prosecution asked questions regarding the Rule 11 hearing interpreter and Sanchez-Martinez's ability to understand him, his understаnding of the advisal of rights form, and his ability to
During the Rule 35(c) hearing in the instant case, the prosecution and the defense agreed that People v. Schneider,
Here, the prosecution instituted questioning in which it sought to establish that Sanchez-Martinez had entered a knowing, voluntary, intelligent plea.
C.
The Trial Court Properly Addressed the Constitutionality of Sanchez, Martinez's Guilty Plea.
Sanchez-Martinez is illiterate in both Spanish and English His misunderstanding of the nature of the Rule 11 hearing indicates that he did not understand the most basic aspects of the United States' criminal justice system. Appearing pro se, he had no legal counsel to assist him in making the determination of whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial. The prosecution elicited testimony from Sanchez-Martinez that indicated: he was not advised of the constitutional rights he would waive by pleading guilty; he pleaded guilty because he mistakenly believed that failure to do so would automatically lead to his incarceration; and he could not understand the interpreter during the Rule 11 hearing.
Sanchez-Martinez filed his Rule 35(c) motion within eighteen months of the date of conviction, as required by section 16-5-402(1). In light of the evidence, Magistrate Mole correctly undertook to examine whether Sanchez-Martiner's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Because a guilty plea affects many of a defendant's substantial rights, the trial court was permitted to address the issue. Crim. P. 52(b); see Boykin,
D.
The Record Supports Magistrate Mole's Conclusion that Sanchez-Martinez's Guilty Plea was Unconstitutional.
In assessing Magistrate Mole's order vacating Sanchez-Martinez's conviction, we defer to his findings of fact and review de novo his conclusion of law that the guilty plea was unconstitutional. See A.J.L.,
Magistrate Mole found Sanchez-Martinez credible, and the record supports that finding. See A.J.L.,
Based on the record before us, we conclude Sanchez-Martinez did not understand the effect of pleading guilty, and his plea did not represent a "voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action." See Hill,
The record shows that Sanchez-Martinez was not informed of and did not understand the alternative courses of action available to him. See Hill,
His misapprehension of the consequences of pleading not guilty underscores the unknowing, involuntary, unintelligent nature of his guilty plea. It also highlights the ways in which procedural safeguards put in place by the constitutions, laws, and rules to protect the rights of criminal defendants failed in this instance.
The record shows that Sanchez-Martines had difficulty understanding the court interpreter provided during the Rule 11 hearing. Cf. Martines-Cruz,
Magistrate Bowen recited the elements of third degree assault, but made no inquiry into whether Sanchez-Martinez actually understood the nature of the constitutional rights waived by pleading guilty, including the right to a jury trial and the right to
The record also indicates that the interpretеr told Sanchez-Martines to sign and initial the advisal of rights form describing the consequences of his guilty plea without reading the form to him. CJ. id. (guilty plea constitutional where bilingual defense attorney explained guilty plea petition to defendant). Because Sanchez-Martines cannot write or read in English or Spanish, he could not have understood the important constitutional rights waived by pleading guilty. See Kyler,
The prosecution argues that Magistrate Mole's findings and conclusions regarding the constitutionality of Sanchez-Martiner's guilty plea should be disregarded because he did not have before him the Rule 11 hearing transcripts. We disagree because Sanchez Martinez's testimony during the Rule 85 hearing explained, rather than refuted, his testimony during the Rule 11 hearing. In response to the district attorney's questions, he gave further, detailed testimony establishing his lack of understanding of the proceedings and the failure of the Rule 11 court to ensure that he was aware of the important constitutional rights he waived by pleading guilty. Had Magistrate Mole been presented with the Rule 11 colloquy transeript, it would have only buttressed his judgment to vacate the guilty plea.
The prosecution had the opportunity to provide the Rule 11 colloquy transeript to the county court and to ask the court to review it. The prosecution did not do so. While this transcript was before the district court on appeal, it summarily dismissed the issue when it erroneously concluded that the prosecution was not on notice of the issue in the proceeding before Magistrate Mole.
Although Sanchez-Martines stated during the Rule 11 hearing that he understood the rights he waived by pleading guilty, the ree-ord supports Magistrate Mole's findings of fact and conclusion that Sanchez-Martinezg's guilty plea was unconstitutional. Considering the totality оf the cireumstances, the combined effect of the several errors at issue in this case-Sanchez-Martinez's lack of understanding of the Rule 11 hearing due to the language barrier and ineffective translation, the defective Rule 11 advisement by the court before entry of the guilty plea, and his lack of knowledge of a criminal defendant's numerous constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial, the right to an attorney, the right to confrontation, and the right to present witnesses on his behalf-support this conclusion. See Kyler,
118
Accordingly, we reverse the district court and reinstate the county court's judgment vacating Sanchez-Martinez's guilty plea.
Notes
. We granted certiorari on the following issues:
(1) Whether the district court erroneously reversed the county court's order vacating the defendant's conviction because his guilty plea was unconstitutional.
(2) Whether the district court erroneously held that the county court could not address the constitutionality of the defendant's guilty plea because the issue was not raised by either party.
(3) Whether the prosecution waived its right to claim lack of notice by not raising the issue in the county court.
. In Farrar v. People, we stated that claims of newly discovered evidence do not implicate the constitutionality of a criminal conviction.
. Although we may accept as true in-court statements made by a defendant during a Rule 11 colloquy, eg., People v. Rockwell,
. The prosecution included the Rule 11 hearing transcript in the record on appeal to the district court. As such, it is properly before us as part of the appellate record.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I consider the majority's resolution of this case to be not only misguided but particularly unfortunate as well. Whether the defendant was read and understood the written Spanish advisement and waiver of rights he signed before entering his guilty plea largely involves a determination of fact, which could
Criminal defendants are liberally entitled to post-conviction relief in this jurisdiction for violations of the Constitution or laws of either the United States or this state. Their applications for post-conviction review, however, must substantially comply with a specific format and contain specifically designated information, including every ground upon which a claim of unlawful confinement is made. See Crim. P. 85(c)@8)(I1); Crim. P. Form 4. For hopefully obvious reasons, the relief requested by a defendant may not be granted without first causing "a complete copy of said motion to be served on the prosecuting attorney," permitting the prosecution thirty days to respond, and if factual determinations are required, conducting a hearing and taking "whatever evidence is necessary for the disposition of the motion." Crim. P. 85(c)(8)(V).
The defendant in this case applied for post-conviction review of his conviction as required by the rule, but did so without the slightest insinuation that he was not advised of or did not understand the rights he was waiving and the plea he was entering. He did not suggest in any way that he was asserting a defect in his plea amounting to a violation of the federal and state laws or constitutions. See Crim. P. 35(0)@)(D. Rather he asserted, in elaborate detail, that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence undermining his wife's credibility. See Crim. P. He relied exclusively on our holding in People v. Schneider, 25 P.8d 755, 762 (Colo.2001), which entitles even defendants entering guilty pleas to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in the limited cireum-stance in which the charges against them are demonstrably false or unfounded. Rather than asserting that his plea was involuntary or unintelligent, or was in any other way unlawful or defective, the defendant instead expressly alleged that the charges to which he pled were false or unfounded.
After hearing the matter, the magistrate completely rejected as unfounded the defendant's claim of entitlement to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Nevertheless, the magistrate vacated the defendant's guilty plea as involuntary and unintelligent, reasoning that Schneider impliedly found a motion for post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence to simultaneously put at issue the validity of the underlying guilty plea. To the contrary, in Schneider we narrowly cireumseribed the relief available for newly discovered evidence following guilty pleas precisely because such claims necessarily accept, rather than contest, the validity of the underlying plea and instead seek new trials entirely on equitable grounds. See id. at 761; see also Farrar v. People,
Instead the majority advances other (but equally unconvincing) justifications for the defendant's failure to assert, in his motion for post-conviction relief, the ineffectiveness of his plea. The majority suggests both that the prosecutor was given adequate notice by
In any event, the majority proceeds to suggest, in reliance on the plain error doctrine of Crim. P. 52, that it was within the discretion of the Crim. P. 85(c) magistrate to address the lawfulness of the defendant's guilty plea, despite its never having been raised in a motion for post-conviction relief, because a guilty plea includes the waiver of substantial rights. The plain error doctrine pеrmits limited review of obvious trial error based on its seriousness, despite the absence of contemporaneous objection. It in no way implies that errors (whether objected to or not) may be reviewed without being raised in the reviewing court, and the authorities relied on by the majority suggest nothing of the sort. We have previously identified situations in which an appellate court may be justified in exercising its discretion to review important issues not expressly raised by a party, see Roberts v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
Finally the majority finds that the defendant's advisement was inadequate and that he failed to understand even the rights of which he was advised. The boilerplate selected by the majority notwithstanding, we have long held that although a providency hearing is designed to evidence the constitutional validity of guilty pleas, see People v. Leonard,
The question whether the defendant perjured himself in claiming at his providency hearing to have read, or had read to him, and understood this written Advisal of Rights, or whether he perjured himself in later claiming at his post-conviction hearing not to understand English, read Spanish, or have had his Spanish Advisal of Rights read to him by his interpreter, is clearly a matter of fact, or credibility. And while many judicial officers might have found a defendant's subsequent self-serving recantation less credible than did
If, as appears to be the case, the defendant is facing deportation consequences of which he was unaware at the time of the providency hearing, he may have alternate grounds for vacating his plea. Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, - U.S. -, - - -,
Because I am disinclined to compromise sound principles of law, no matter how sympathetic a particular defendant may be, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice RICE and Justice EID join in this dissent.
. By footnote the majority attempts to distinguish Farrar but not on the grounds that the defendant's claim of newly discovered evidence put the prosecutor on notice of a challenge to the validity of his guilty plea as well. See maj. op. at 1257 n.2.